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This thesis examines the commitment made by world leaders in the support of military 
humanitarian intervention in the name of human rights. In the context of humanitarian 
intervention in international law it can be said that there is ample state practice to indicate 
that the strength of opinion juris is not fully established. Humanitarian intervention, 
however, remains a highly controversial issue as it draws from the concept of universality 
central to the human rights discourse at the same time as it changes dominant 
conceptualizations of state sovereignty. 
This thesis assesses the effectiveness of existing Articles of the United Nations 
Charter framework that aim to reduce human rights violations. To establish a framework 
this thesis will rely on different writings by Mr. Kofi Annan, former Secretary General 
of United Nations, for their emphasis on the need for international actors to work toward 
the “common good” in order to realize a stable and secure international order. I examine 
four case studies:  Bosnia (UN inaction), Kosovo (action without Security Council 
authorization), Libya (intervention with Security Council authorization), Syria (yet a 
case of inaction, even though violence is evident).   
The hypothesis that guides my thesis is that leaders at times place the moral 
imperative for humanitarian intervention above national interest but not always. National 
interests at other times prevent the moral action needed. I argue that: 
1) The implementation of Responsibility to Protect has been inconsistent: 
Evidence will show the selectivity: Libya yes, Syria no. 
2) Implementation is dependent on the national interests of major powers, 
especially the P-5.  
3) UN and regional organizations must all be on board as they did for Libya 
under resolution 1973. 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that although, the adoption of the notion of 
the Responsibility to Protect, the subsidization of preventive mechanisms, and the 
creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide where the 
international community have had a significant impact, there needs to be more efficient 
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This thesis will analyze the international community’s response to humanitarian 
intervention and crimes against humanities. The international community failed to 
respond to the horrific genocide of 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda and thus was passive in the 
face of continued loss of human life; the shameful unwillingness of UN peacekeeping 
forces to prevent the murderous ethnic cleansing of 7,000 to 8,000 Muslim men and boys 
in Srebrenica in Bosnia in July 1995; and the unauthorized intervention in response to the 





Because of the guilt emerging from Rwanda and Bosnia, NATO intervened in Kosovo in 
1999 and later on in Libya in 2011 to redeem their moral conscience and to rescue 
innocent civilians from brutal crimes of violence and ethnic cleansing in the case of 
Kosovo. NATO’s action in Kosovo was a violation of the United Nations Charter due to 
the lack of Security Council authorization, whereas the intervention in Libya was legal 
because the Security Council in Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force. It appeared 
that the intervention in Kosovo and later on the adoption of Responsibility to Protect 
opened the road to humanitarian interventions. However this thesis will demonstrate that 
the moral imperative does not always prevail in the face of national interest. In 2005, 
                                                          
1) Christopher C. Joyner, “The responsibility to Protect, International Law”, in Charlotte Ku and Paul Diehl, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers 2009, page 321. 
6 
 
heads of states at the World Summit unanimously adopted the Responsibility to Protect in 
their “Outcome Document,” which was based on the idea of “sovereignty as 
responsibility,” and embraced a dual responsibility: externally to respect the sovereignty 
of other states and internally to respect and protect human rights of citizens within the 
state.  
 
The adoption of R2P represents significant progress on human rights but its effects on 
humanitarian intervention have been limited.  The thrust of the responses to humanitarian 
crises in the post R2P period remains uneven and deeply influenced by leaders who 
follow national/self-interests in the decision making process surrounding the question of 
whether to intervene in a humanitarian crisis or not. While guilt remains there has been 
no intervention now in the crisis in Syria. Only in a few cases, the intervention for 
humanitarian purposes has been declared under circumstances that were actually 
humanitarian rather than motivated by self-interest and power-seeking.
2
 
The inconsistency of world leaders in responding differently in cases of military 
humanitarian intervention has caused significant loss of lives and global and regional 
instability. Compared to Rwanda’s genocide, now the world is better in taking preventive 
action, but still not very good.   The fact remains that another Rwanda even though not 
genocide but still mass murder, is happening now in Syria and it is not likely to end  
soon. The most useful analogy to help us understand the failure of atrocities in Syria is 
Bosnia. The violence in Bosnia, as in Syria was carried out by a national army and 
                                                          
2. James Traub, If we can let Syria burn, Have we learned nothing at all from Rwanda?  Foreign Policy 
magazine, April, 04, 2014.  




paramilitaries as a matter of state policy which made it harder to prevent.
3
 Both wars 
went on for years, and thus offered the international community the opportunity to 
intervene. President Obama is doing now in Syria the same thing that president Clinton 
did in Bosnia; he did not want to intervene in Bosnia because he feared the political costs 
of a failed intervention. Although Clinton worked to bring about a negotiated solution, 
hoping all the while that Europe would act.
 
And yet, we see the willingness of world 
leaders and international community to intervene in extreme cases of human rights 
violations, even though President Obama himself established an Atrocities Prevention 
Board on April 23, 2012, and has in his cabinet brilliant advocates of the Responsibility 
to Protect such as Susan Rice and Samantha Power.
3
 On the other hand, he did agree to 
be part of NATO’s intervention in Libya, for preventing mass killing from the hand of 
Muammar al-Qadaffi in Benghazi in 2011. Yet Syria has proven too hard, as Bosnia did 
for Clinton until the mass killing that took place in Srebrenica.
4  
 
The hypothesis that guides my thesis is that evidence will show that leaders at times place 
the moral imperative for humanitarian intervention above national interest but not always. 
National interests at other times prevent the moral action needed. 
 As noted in abstract my argument is: 
4) The implementation of Responsibility to Protect has been inconsistent: 
Evidence will show the inconsistency. Intervention in Libya yes, Syria no. 
                                                          
 
 3. Jonas Claes, United States Institute of Peace,article at:  
 http://www.usip.org/publications/obama-announces-formation-the-atrocities-prevention-board 
 On April 23, 2012, President Obama announced the formation of the Atrocities Prevention Board and 
other steps to help the United States prevent and respond to mass atrocities.  





5) Implementation is dependent on the national interest of major powers, 
especially the P-5.  
6) UN and regional organizations must all be on board as they did for Libya 
under resolution 1973. 
 
In order to validate my argument I have selected the 1995 Bosnia crisis, 1999 Kosovo, 
2011 Libya, and Syria today which will further help illustrate the concept of humanitarian 
intervention, before and after the initiation of R2P, and how the response to humanitarian 
crises still remains deeply influenced by world leaders who follow national self-interests 
in the decision making process whether to intervene or not. I carefully choose these cases 
in order to have a broad spectrum of non- humanitarian intervention and humanitarian 
intervention. Bosnia and Syria are cases of non -humanitarian intervention, while Kosovo 
is a case of humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization, where 
NATO’s action was a violation of United Nations Charter. “Kosovo is widely touted as 
an almost perfect example of humanitarian intervention , where the intervening 
actors' primary purpose was to rescue innocent civilians from a brutal ethnic cleansing 
campaign.
5
The promotion of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo will be the pivotal case 
of this thesis. 
                                                          
5. Enric Heinze, Waging humanitarian war: “The ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention”. 




Libya is a case of humanitarian intervention under the recent concept of R2P with the 
SC’s authorization under resolution 1973, and Syria is yet a case of non -intervention 
where the war is still going on.  
Throughout this thesis I propose that when the most basics human rights are being 
violated, leaders, especially P5 of SC, should not close their eyes in the face of genocide, 
ethnic cleansing or mass murder. Therefore, I will analyze what the international 
community has done during these crises and what could have been done to prevent this 
violence.  
Furthermore, this thesis will give a broad description of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention by analyzing the United Nations Charter (UN), practice, the   North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Responsibility to Protect, international law and other 
relevant international actors. 
 In the course of my discussion, I will examine the legality of armed interventions by 
looking at the international community’s responsibility to act and on the other hand state 
sovereignty, and how evolving norms and practices within the global regime have 
changed on such topics and attitudes toward global intervention.     
Research on these cases will allow me to assess what kind of criteria should be weighted 
in international humanitarian intervention, norms, and how the development of human 
rights has influenced the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect as a norm and as a 




The research questions that are addressed in this thesis are: 
What is humanitarian intervention? 
What is state sovereignty, its relation with humanitarian intervention? 
How was brought the Responsibility to Protect created? 
What is the role of United Nations? 
What is the role of international actors? 
What kind of criteria should be weighted in humanitarian interventions?  
Why the inaction in Bosnia? 
Why action in Kosovo even though without SC’s authorization? 
Why action in Libya with SC’s authorization? 
Why yet not a decision for action in Syria? 
 
What is humanitarian intervention?  
“Humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or 
international organisation primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the 
target state from widespread deprivations of international recognised human rights."
6
 
                                                          
6. Ian  Brownie’s assertions in the Oral Pleadings of 10 May 1999 in the Case Concerning the Legality of  
the Use of Force ( the FRY v NATO Members) and the summary in Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: International Law 
Aspects , ICLQ 2000, vol 49 at page 886 
7. Sean Murphy,  " Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order" 1996, at 
pp 11.  
11 
 
Humanitarian intervention was deemed by many to be an impermissible assault on state 
sovereignty.
7 “
Traditionally, international law empowers a sovereign state to exercise 
exclusive, absolute jurisdiction within its territorial borders, and that other states and 
multilateral actors have the corresponding duty not to interfere in a state’s internal 
affair”.
8
 However, as Mr. Annan puts it:  
State sovereignty is being redefined by the forces of globalization and 
international cooperation. The state is now widely understood to be the 
servant of its people, not vice versa. At the same time, individual 
sovereignty --the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and 
every individual as enshrined in our Charter-- has been enhanced by a 





  He continued to argue that; “While the genocide in Rwanda will define for our 
generation the consequences of inaction in the face of mass murder, the conflict in 
Kosovo has prompted important questions about the consequences of action in the 
absence of complete unity on the part of the international community.”   
The focus here will remain in two types of intervention, without Security Council’s 
express authorization and with SC’s authorization. When the latter is given, the action 
taken by States or regional organizations fits comfortably under Article 39 and Art 42 of 
Chapter VII of the Charter as it did for example in  Libya.  It is when the authorization is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8. Joyner, p.324 







not given or asked for as indeed happened in the case of Kosovo, that the most 
controversial issues arise.  As Reisman puts it:  
Even when it is generally accepted that a system is failing to respond to a 
violation whose remedy has been assigned exclusively to a formal 
decision maker or the human consequences of the failure are especially 
grave, some participants-international lawyers in particular-may insist 
that, good intentions notwithstanding, greater systematic injury will be 
caused by the prospective unilateral action than by failure of designated 
decision-maker to respond adequately. Nor is this always, as exponents of 
unilateral action contend, a dreamy retreat from a nastily imperfect reality. 




Humanitarian intervention is to be seen, initially, in the context of the current trends on 
the use of force generally and whether resorting to force under the umbrella of 
humanitarian intervention is a legal concept provided for in international law.  
 Immediate reference is made to the obvious written international law, the UN Charter. 
And the immediate answer to that is: no.  The use of force is prohibited expressly by 
Article 2(4) of the Charter: 
         All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations. 
 
                                                          
10. Michael Reisman, “Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process” 
11EJIL 2000 at p.7  
13 
 
It is permitted only in the case of self-defence, individual or collective, as prescribed in 
Article 51:  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence in an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security… 
 
Force is also legal when authorized by the Security Council and carried out by regional 
organisations, group of States or the Security Council itself.  
Furthermore, it has long been accepted that the nature of the prohibition in Article 2(4) is 
that of jus cogens,
11
 a status that allows for no derogation and which can only be altered, 
amended or replaced by another norm of the very same peremptory status.  As a result, 
Article 2(4) is binding upon States, whether acting individually or collectively as 
Members of international organizations, more importantly on those of a military character 
such as NATO, over and above any other obligation that derives from any other Treaty. It 
is also naturally binding on the organizations themselves.   
But are territorial integrity and political independence the only two pillars to be 
safeguarded by this prohibition? If that were the case, then, arguably, there would be 
space in the Charter for legal justification of humanitarian intervention. If not, reference 
needs to be made to other sources of international law. 
Article 2(4) is not restrictive to the territorial integrity and political independence of a 
sovereign State.  "…in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
                                                          
 
11. Bruno Simma, Interpretation of Article 2(4) The Charter of the United Nations: “A Commentary” 
Oxford University Press, 1994,  p.106 
14 
 
Nations" suggests a permissive character which might classify an intervention as illegal 
even though it is not strictly directed against the territorial integrity and  political 
independence of a State. This would mean that in the case of Kosovo, NATO’s 
intervention, had as its purpose neither the invasion of Serbia, nor the acquisition of its 
governing power, but could still be a breach of Article 2(4).  
The same conclusion on its permissive character can be drawn from the preparative work 
of the Charter.  In Chapter II of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the original draft made 
no mention of territorial integrity or political independence, by subjecting any resort to 
force to the test of inconsistency with the purposes of the United Nations. After 
dismissing suggestions such as by Ecuador to incorporate in the wording of the Article, 
acts of aggression, and the Brazilian proposal to expand to direct and indirect threats and 
excessive foreign influences, the San Francisco Conference
12
 adapted the Australian 
amendment, which produced the current formulation of the Article 2(4) in the UN 
Charter.  
However, there is pause for thought here:  "any other manner" has to be inconsistent with 
the purposes of United Nations and NATO's intervention in Kosovo was anything but 
inconsistent with those purposes.  Aiming to bring to an end the humanitarian catastrophe 
and ethnic cleansing, the massive and continuous breaches of fundamental human rights 
of the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb authorities, their purpose was consistent with what 
was clearly stated in the Preamble of the Charter, itself:
13
 
                                                          
12. History of the United Nations,  Preparative works, San Francisco Conference, 1945 at 
https://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/  
13. Evans Malcolm, United Nations Charter, “Blackstone’s International Law Documents”, 4
th
 edition, 
1999, p.8.  
15 
 
  We, the Peoples of United Nations Determined “…. To reaffirm faith in 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights to men and women and of nations large and small…" encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 
Furthermore, in Article 1(3)
14
 of Chapter 1: "The purposes of the United Nations are:  
 To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of 
….a social… or humanitarian character, and in promoting and   
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
15
  
Clearly, NATO was trying to save its credibility by doing in Kosovo what it did not in 
Rwanda. Moreover, as it was seen above, the draft in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal put 
the emphasis entirely on the matter of consistency, without feeling the need to name any 
of the elements that were intended to be guaranteed.  Furthermore, humanitarian 
intervention is not stated as any of the other potential inconsistent manners of the Charter. 
As Brownlie clearly stated:  “It must be admitted that humanitarian intervention has not 
been expressly condemned by the League Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the 
United Nations Charter. Indeed, such intervention would not constitute resort to force as 
an instrument of national policy."
16
 
Thus, it can be argued that if NATO's intervention was not threatening the two expressed 
elements of the personality of a State in Article 2(4) or being inconsistent with any other 
                                                          
14.  Also Article 55 and Article 56 of the Charter provide for the promotion of human rights. 
15.Fernando Teson ,"Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality" New York 1996, at 
page 13 
16
 Ian Brownlie, " International Law and the Use of Force by States, OUP, 1963, page 338  
16 
 
purpose of the UN, then there is clearly no breach of the prohibition on the use of force 
Article.  
However, other distinguished academics appear to take the opposite view by identifying 
territorial integrity, especially where linked with political independence, with territorial 
inviolability.
17
 In the case of Kosovo, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht said: 
 … a State would be acting in breach of its obligations under the Charter if 
it were to invade or commit an act of force within the territory of another 
State, in anticipation of an alleged impending attack or in order to obtain 
redress, without the intention or interfering permanently with the territorial 
integrity of that state.
18
   
The interpretation of the law on the use of force did not follow any revolutionary path. In 
1970 the Friendly Relations Declaration 
19
 clearly reconfirmed the same approach:  
 No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of 
any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or 




Four years later, in 1974, the General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression precluded 
any kind of justification for the use of force by stating that: “No consideration of 
                                                          
17
 Oppenheim's International Law, 1952, Volume II,  
18
 ibid,  
19
 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970 at "The principle concerning 
the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the 
Charter”, at  http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm 
20.  ibid., 
17 
 




More specifically, humanitarian intervention has been regarded by many (some of them 
presiding over the International Court of Justice) as incompatible with the United Nations 
Charter. However, the notion does not owe its existence to March 1999.  People like 
Brownlie, Akehurst , Conforti  or Simma
22
 in various years before 1999, regardless of 
opposing the compatibility of humanitarian intervention with the Charter proved two 
points: first, the notion existed and has been invoked as a legal justification by military 
actions taken by  UN Member States and secondly, the condemnation  has not proved 
strong enough to cause  legislative steps  that would expressly forbid it. This suggests that 
although some legal anomaly was already recognized, a practical way to overcome the 
legal lacuna was becoming a necessity. Although, the written provisions of UN Charter 
as one of the sources of international law do not explicitly refer to humanitarian 
intervention, it should be given consideration to customary international law as the other 
main source.  While treaties are static by nature and have proven resistant and difficult at 
their best to alteration and amendment, customary law, as a barometer, indicates the 
dynamics of international law, by offering  the possibility to be flexible to political and 
other changes of society's needs.
23
  Thus, its character is highly important to humanitarian 
intervention as an emerging concept in international law, a possibility that was 
acknowledged by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case when stating that:  
                                                          
21.  General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), Article 5  
22.  Ibid.,  
23. Sean D. Murphy “Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order” 1996, at 
pg 8.  
18 
 
"The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct prima facie inconsistent with the 
principle of non-intervention lies in the nature of the ground offered as justification. 
Reliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, 
if shared in principle by other States, tend towards modification of customary law."
24
 
To conclude that humanitarian intervention creates customary law, state practice must be 
followed by opinio juris cive necessitates, the intention of states to consider the practice 
as legally binding as it was reaffirmed in the Nicaragua case
25
.  The practice pattern and 














                                                          
24.  Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at pp 207 
25. Tim Hillier "Sourcebook on Public International Law" ,  Cavendish Publishing , 1999 





For the purpose of this thesis, regarding humanitarian intervention I will relay on   Kofi 
Atta Annan’s work, who served as the seventh Secretary-General of the United 
Nations from January 1997 to December 2006, who is a pillar of human rights.   Annan 
and the United Nations were the co-recipients of the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize "for their 
work for a better organized and more peaceful world."
27
 
His excellent support for human rights will help give a better understanding about how 
the United Nations responds to the political, human rights and humanitarian crises 
affecting so much of the world; about the means employed by the international 
community in situations of need; and about our willingness to act in some areas of 
conflict, while limiting ourselves to humanitarian palliatives in many other crises whose 
daily toll of death and suffering ought to shame us into action.   
Furthermore, I will relay on authors such as Thomas G. Weiss whose research of two 
decades provides a compelling introduction to the theory and practice of humanitarian 
intervention in the modern world.  He examines political, ethical, legal, strategic, 
economic, and operational dimensions and uses a wide range of cases to highlight key 
debates, controversies and as well as the normative evolution of what is increasingly 
known as "the responsibility to protect" 
28
 
                                                          
27.  http://www.biography.com/people/kofi-annan-9185694#awesm=~oC59rpucbLQUjB 
28
 Thomas G. Weiss, “Humanitarian Intervention”, published in 2007 by Polity Press, Cambridge, UK 
20 
 
Christopher C. Joyner examines the legality of armed intervention by highlighting the 
role of governmental responsibilities as it relates to national sovereignty. He carefully 
examines the concept of humanitarian intervention, deals with UN charter framework and 
identifies criteria that ought to be weighted regarding international intervention to halt 
genocide or ethnic cleansing. He gives a number of reflections on the “Responsibility to 
Protect” as a norm, and on the other hand, the prospects for mobilizing international will 
to convert moral rhetoric into legal opportunity. 
29
 
In regard to unilateral action, PhD Michael Riesman gives a clear definition by 
explaining that: 
Unilateral actions are taken by an unauthorized participant who contends 
they are, nonetheless, lawful”. He explains that: “The normative ambiguity 
of unilateral actions in contemporary international law arises from the 
regrettable but acknowledged intermittent ineffectiveness of decision 




In regards to unilateral action, and again Kosovo, Bruno Simma said that: “In the case of 
Kosovo, only a thin red line separates NATO’s action from international legality. To 
resort to illegality as an explicit ultima ratio for reasons as convincing as those in the 
Kosovo case is one thing. To turn such an exception into general policy is quite 
                                                          
29
 Joyner chapter 16. The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Concern and the 
Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, in International Law, edited by Charlotte Ku and Paul 
F. Diehl, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009 London, UK 
30
 Michael Reisman, “Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World 





 Furthermore, as seen in the introduction, in his interpretation of article 2(4) he 
states that:  It has long been accepted that the nature of the prohibition in Article 2(4) is 
that of jus cogens,
32
 a status that allows for no derogation and which can only be altered, 
amended or replaced by another norm of the very same peremptory status. Antonio 
Cassese, also agrees with Simma on the legitimacy of use of force by NATO in 
Kosovo.
33
  He explores the notion that “NATO’s action may nevertheless be taken as 
evidence of an emerging doctrine in international law allowing the use of forcible 
countermeasures to impede a state from committing large-scale atrocities on its own 
territory, in circumstances where the Security Council is incapable of responding 
adequately to the crisis.”  However, the author argues that: “a customary rule may emerge 
which would legitimize the use of force by a group of states in the absence of prior 
authorization by the Security Council.” 
34
This might bring the threat to global security 
which is inevitably involved in the use of force without such authorization.  
Fernando Teson, argues that the promotion of human rights in the context of the Charter 
is equally important to the control of international conflict. In his paper: The Liberal Case 
                                                          
31
 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/1.full.pdf 
32.  For an interpretation of Article 2(4) Simma, Bruno " UN Charter Commentary" 
OUP, 1995 at pg 106 , also Simma states that Article 39 does not authorize states to use 
force or forceful countermeasures 
6. Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EJIL 1999 at pg 
Cassese, A: “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are we Moving towards International Legitimatization 
of Art. 24.  
 
34
 Antonio Cassesse, Comment on Bruno Simma, NATO, The UN and the Use of Force at: 
Ex iniuria ius oritur,  Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 





, he develops a twin assumption of liberal moral and 
political theory:  “that, the primary purpose of the government is to protect human rights, 
and that victims of grievous injustice are entitled to outside help. Humanitarian 
intervention is legitimate when it is directed at suppressing human rights abuses and 
complies with the doctrine of double effect.”
36
  
Again in regards to humanitarian intervention, Sean D. Murphy states that "… 
International Law in its broadest sense should be regarded not merely as a system of 
rules, but rather, as a comprehensive process by which states and other international 
actors make authoritative and more or less controlling decisions, driven in part by past 
decisions and in part by contemporary community expectations".
37
 
Samantha Power, with her book:  A Problem from Hell
38 
 gives an overview of lack of 
response to genocide   in the 20th century. She explains why has the U.S. failed to act to 
stop (or attempt to stop) genocides from happening by analyzing reaction to six different 
genocides (Armenia, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Iraq/Kurds, Rwanda, and 
Serbia/Bosnia/Kosovo) examining what US knew, what did, and why, and see what sorts 
of patterns emerge. Her conclusion is that a lack of political/moral "will" to act combine 
with a self-serving political calculus (political risk than failure to act) mean that barring 
changes, US is very unlikely to act to prevent genocide now or in the future.  For the 
interest of this thesis this book will be used in the case of Bosnia.                                               
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In regards to Arab Spring, Vijad Pashad explores the recent history of the Qadhafi 
regime, and the social forces who opposed him. 
39
 
 Many other scholars will be consulted in regards to R2P such as:  Thomas G. Weiss, 
Ramesh Thakur, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Aidan Hehir  Alex J. Bellamy, David Chandler, 
Rodger Shanahan, Rachel Gerber, Abiodun Williams, Gareth Evans. The scholars 




The main argument of this analyzes is the evolvement of R2P norm.  
As seen above in the introduction, R2P emerged in 2000 as a concept of international 
relations. R2P focuses on the notion of sovereignty; it is known in international law that a 
state has absolute supremacy over its territory and citizens. “In the ICISS report,
41
 
“sovereignty was re-defined and extended to include the responsibility a state bears 
towards protecting its own civilians from harm”. In addition, in cases where a state is 
unable or unwilling to protect
42
  its civilians from mass atrocity crimes, the international 
community has a responsibility to act immediately in order to prevent or halt such crimes. 
“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
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Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations.”The ICISS report 
highlights four distinct crimes where R2P should be applied.  Those are: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which had previously been defined 
under international law by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
For the case of Syria, I will focus the research mainly in journal articles such as Reuters, 
Guardian, NY Times, BBC, and interview of NATO’s Secretary General Anders Fogh 



















RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
Chapter three 
From the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 until 1998—sovereignty functioned as 
institutionalized indifference. The international intervention in Kosovo broke that mold 
and was the backdrop for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s search for a new norm.
43
 
The Responsibility to Protect, evolved as a concept from the pure aspiration of Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, to the status of a norm in process of becoming a legal principle.  
He made compelling appeals to the international community in his Millennium speech in 
2000, in order to resolve the dilemma of humanitarian intervention.
44
 He clearly 
illustrated the nature of the debate about the responsibility of the International 
Community to protect civilians in situations of crisis and at the same time to remain 
committed to another fundamental principle which is state sovereignty. He argued: 
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to 
gross and systematic    violations of human rights that offend every 




To respond to Annan’s call to action, the Canadian government established an 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, in September 2000. The 
Responsibility to Protect was issued as a report in December 2001. Chaired by, Gareth 
Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. The R2P was affirmed in 2005, when it was included in 
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the consensus Outcome Document of the UN World Summit. The doctrine is based in 
three pillars: 
First, the duty of every state to protect its people from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity;  
Second, a commitment on the part of the international community 
to assist states in fulfilling their responsibilities; 
Third, the preparedness of countries to take remedial action under 





Since its adoption eight years ago, R2P has emerged as a widely shared norm in 
international relations, and every country has made a commitment to protect citizens 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and ( at least in 
theory) to act accordingly.
47
  . In 2011, United Nations Security Council invoked the R2P 
by authorizing a humanitarian military intervention aimed to halt mass atrocities and 
crimes against humanity in Libya, which demonstrated the full triumph of this norm. 
However, since world leaders unanimously embraced R2P in 2005, the international 
community has had a mixed track record of applying these principles when mass violence 
is threatened or occurs. Despite the idealistic promises of its frame, unfortunately the 
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crimes that R2P was supposed to prevent have continued at a shocking pace in the last 
few years, as in the most recent unsolved case of Syria.  For the interest of this thesis, the 
legacy of the international response in Libya, and Syria will be analyzed. Through these 
two cases I will demonstrate that the gap between warning and response is still a 
challenge for the international community and also propose that global leaders should 
insist that the duties which all countries have acknowledged must be taken seriously and 
acted on with determination and vigor.   
The Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect 
If a government is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, or furthermore is executing 
massive human rights crimes against its people, then the R2P delegates the international 
community to act. The Responsibility to Protect is multidimensional as it involves: 
1) Responsibility to react, which is the most important one. It responds to situations 
of compelling human need, with appropriate measures including armed force, if 
necessary. 
48
 When the preventing efforts fail to halt internal violence and the 
government is powerless or unwilling to remedy, then measures of humanitarian 
intervention by the international community may be necessary.  
2) Responsibility to prevent includes political means, diplomatic initiatives, and 
economical strategies and, if necessary, military force.
49
  
3) Responsibility to rebuild is the aftermath of an intervention that includes 
reconstruction and recovery of a society from violent war.
50
 
Sovereignty as Responsibility 
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As Evans puts it,   the principle of sovereign equality of states is enshrined in Article 2, 
Section 1, of the UN Charter, and the corresponding norm of nonintervention is 
enshrined in Article 2, Section 7: a sovereign state is empowered by international law to 
exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders, and other states 
have the corresponding duty not to intervene in its internal affairs.
51
 Furthermore, no 
state holds unlimited power to do what it wants to its own people. It is acknowledged in 
international relations that; sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to 
respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic 
rights of all the people within the state.
52
 As Joyner argues, “the notion of sovereignty 
should be conceived as the preeminent need for the government of a state to exercise 
responsibility, not merely control over its action. In regard to sovereignty and the UN 
Charter, Annan writes that:” If states bent on criminal behavior know that frontiers are 
not an absolute; if they know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes 
against humanity, then they will not embark on such a course of action in expectation of 
sovereign impunity.”
53
 As mentioned above, state authority is not absolute; internally it 
depends on constitution, government, local, provincial and national power.” 
Internationally, too, in human rights covenants, UN practice and state practice itself, 
sovereignty is understood as embracing responsibility. The UN Charter is an example of 
an international obligation voluntarily accepted by member states.”
54
 This doesn’t mean 
that there should be a change in the status of state sovereignty, what R2P suggests is 
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that, it should be a change in the exercise of sovereignty: from sovereignty as control to 
sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties.
55
  
The R2P doctrine was repeatedly invoked in connection with Libya when, in 2011, 
opposition protests challenged the legitimacy of the country’s longtime dictator, 
Muammar al-Qadhafi , who threatened the protestors by calling them foreign mercenaries 
and vowed to fight to the “last drop of blood.”
56
  To stop a mass murder the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1973 in response to the escalating civil war in Libya, on 17 
March 2011. The intervention was led by the UK, France, US - and NATO. Libya marks 
the first time that the Security Council has authorized an international R2P operation. In 
the Balkans, it took NATO a full decade to intervene with air power, with the adoption of 
R2P in Libya, it took one month to mobilize a broad coalition, secure a UN mandate, 
establish and enforce a no-fly and no-drive zones, stop Qadhafi’s advancing army and 





 explained the intervention in Libya, during her lessons of international 
law; there are three factors which led to this intervention. First, Libya’s geographical 
position is an open desert landscape.  Its proximity to Europe made it easy for allied 
countries to intervene militarily, (a non- intervention meant for Europe a huge influx of 
refugees and destabilization of whole continent).  Second, the Arab League endorsed the 
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intervention, including Libya’s neighborhood. Third, Russia and China members of 
UNSC P-5 didn’t impose the veto this time, they rather chose to abstain.  
The resolution 1973 shows that including R2P language in the preamble might provide 
the normative justification in the operational paragraphs of the UN mandates.
59
 
Regardless of the debate of many writers that the intervention in Libya was made for oil, 
as Thakur writes, the operation in Libya marks a pivotal rebalancing of interests and 
values.  
The intervention in Libya demonstrates how R2P can be applied as a norm, if world 
leaders are willing to save lives and punish those who intend to carry out crimes against 
humanity. It remains to be seen whether this intervention will be viewed in the future as a 
precedent or merely as a tale. The controversy is reflected in the Security Council 
paralysis over robust action in Syria, where the bloodshed inflicted by the regime is far 
worse than Libya. 
The civil war in Syria grew out of the Arab Spring. President Bashar al-Assad’s refused 
the demands for political reform, instead imposed brutal repression.  
The international community is responding with verbal condemnations, repeated efforts 
at mediation, the temporary introduction of human rights monitors, rigorous economic 
sanctions, and aid for refugees, but, yet  no intervention.  In the meantime, the number of 
the dead in Syria now exeeds150, 000
60
 with the regime rolling bombs out of helicopters 
into civilian areas. In 2012, several USA senior advisors, including, Clinton and Petraeus 
proposed a much greater effort to arm Syria’s moderate rebels. President Obama declined 
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to act, hoping for negotiated solutions which have never had a chance of succeeding 
without the threat of force. 
61
In an interview for BBC, Mr. Annan said: “When the people 
of Syria desperately need action, the main problem remains the disunity of international 
community.” Russia and China have vetoed the resolution three times, there continues to 
be finger pointing and name calling in the SC. Syria continued to suffer until the use of 
chemical weapons in August 2013 led to threats of force and accelerated international 
diplomacy to dismantle them.
62
 This led to intense negotiations of diplomatic efforts to 
include mediators such as Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi. While the UN could have 
well justified an R2P response, they did not. Again geopolitics triumphed over the 
protection of civilians and human rights.  In comparison with Libya, why not Syria is 
clear: The geography of Syria is harsher than Libya, the politics in the country are 
different, it has a tougher military challenge, and there’s a double veto from China and 
Russia. 
The terrible carnage in Syria illustrates that the embrace of R2P is not sufficient 
especially when the permanent members of the Security Council are divided and external 
military intervention is difficult. R2P is the duty of every state, the failure to govern 
effectively and fairly is a primary threat to its realization. Does this mean that R2P is 
dead? No!  As Weiss explains, “Syria demonstrates that a robust R2P response is never 
automatic.”
63
 As mentioned above, Syria is distinctly more complicated, chancy and 
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confused than Libya. However, “Syria currently shames the collective international 
conscience and appears to dash the hopes for decisive outside military intervention.”
64
  
The Responsibility to Protect was intended as a road map to prevent humanitarian 
catastrophes from evolving. The atrocities R2P is intended to halt, are often, planned by 
some governments or leaders who are intent on imposing their will on others through 
terror and violence. Such plans frequently develop over a period of time and are preceded 
by hostile words, policies, and actions.
65
  The effectiveness of R2P depends on the ability 
and willingness of the international community to respond whenever and wherever the 
evidence of an impending crisis appears, as the case of Syria is clear proof. If the 
international community, especially SC P-5, translates R2P into action, that will actually 
prevent and halt genocide and other forms of mass atrocity. Its success depends on the 
attitudes and actions of countries over time. World leaders must recognize the doctrine as 
both universal and continuous, leave apart national self-interest, and apply it to every 
country at all times. The world community must proceed on this basis. R2P is the most 
extraordinary norm to ensure peace and reduce human suffering. If in critical moments 
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UN INVOLVEMENT in BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA 
Chapter four 
UN involvement in the former Yugoslavia before the outbreak of the Bosnian war 
 
The former Yugoslavia was not a big concern of the UN until the federation started to 
disintegrate the early 1990s. The first armed clashes in the federation of Yugoslavia 
started in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. The European 
Community (EC) responded to the world during the crises in Yugoslavia by proclaiming 
that the wars going on in the former Yugoslavia were a European problem that could be 
handled by the EC. Still observing the situation in Europe, the UN decided to get 
involved in the Yugoslavian crises in late 1991. The Security Council adopted resolution 
No.713 which imposed an arms embargo on all republics of Yugoslavia; however this 
decision did not hurt Serbia. “On September 25, 1991, the United Nations Security 
Council banned arms sales to all parts of Yugoslavia, an action that in the long run gave a 
military advantage to the Serbs, who inherited the JNA and its weapons.”
66
 On the other 
hand, Bosnia and Croatia were badly hurt from the arms embargo, as they did not possess 
much weaponry of their own, especially heavy arms.  
 
As the wars started to break out in almost all Yugoslavian republics, the UN appointed 
Cyrus Vance, former US Secretary of State, to act as its mediator in Yugoslavia.  Vance 
was able to achieve a cease-fire and temporary settle the conflict in Croatia (known as 
Vance plan) which was followed by the deployment of the UN peacekeepers, 
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UNPROFOR in the most war affected areas of Croatia along the border with Serbia.  The 
UN decided to settle its headquarters in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo thinking that its 
presence there would stop the conflict from spreading to Bosnia.  Moreover, the UN took 
an extra step in tightening Serbian actions by imposing economic sanctions on Belgrade. 
A decision this made in cooperation with the EC and the United States. Also after the 
Republic of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia declared their independence, the UN expelled 
Yugoslavia, made up of only Serbia and Montenegro, form the UN. The three former 
Yugoslavian republics were recognized by the United States and one day later they were 
accepted by the UN as members. Also, Bosnian independence was recognized by the EC 
and it is believed that the US even advised the Bosnian government to seek 
independence. However, Bosnian recognition by the major powers, the presence of the 
UN troops in Sarajevo and its membership in the UN did not prevent the country from 
engaging in a long and catastrophic ethnic war.  
 
UN role after the outbreak of war in Bosnia 
After the situation in Croatia was settled with the implementation of the Vance plan, 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) withdrew from Croatia and joined the Bosnian Serb 
army starting “ethnic cleansing” against the innocent civilians of Bosnia.  At this point 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had to extend and reinforce UNPROFOR’s 
mandate in Bosnia. As the war went on, UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended a several 
times.  
UNPROFOR’s priorities were to: 
35 
 
 Ensure that the Sarajevo airport was safe and would function efficiently in 
transporting humanitarian aid.  
 Assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver 
humanitarian aid in different areas of Bosnia.  
 Protect members of International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) while 
transferring released civilian detainees.  
 Monitor the “no-fly zone”, assuring that there would be no military flights over 
the areas.  
 Protect the “safe areas” established by the Security Council including the town of 
Sarajevo from attacks.  
But how could UNPROFOR succeed in implementing its mandate, when from the 
very beginning it begun facing major obstacles?  There were only about 16,300 UN 
peacekeepers in Bosnia, who were not trained well and were poorly supplied by different 
countries that had sent them. Some of them came even without winter clothes and many 
others without weapons. Meanwhile the Serbian aggressive army not only outnumbered 
the UN forces, but they were very well trained and equipped with heavy weaponry 
received from Belgrade. The UN presence there was not even taken seriously into 
consideration. Firstly, UNPPROFOR’s main purpose in Bosnia was to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the evacuated civilians. However, gradually the Security 
Council got involved in providing services to the war torn civilians such as “safe areas” 
and a “no-fly zone.” However, the assistance provided by the UN to the Bosnian civilians 
is considered the worst of our time. Massive torture, rape and massacres happened in the 
safe areas of the UN in the presence of the peacekeepers. In order to achieve their goal, 
36 
 
the UN forces would have needed to be much better prepared and equipped to get 
involved in the armed clashes with the conflicting parties. However, fighting against any 
of the parties would have meant taking sides which would have contradicted the 
philosophy of peacekeeping missions and would have gone against UN mandate.  
As bad as the situation would get in the Bosnian enclaves, with thousands of Muslims 
being killed savagely, raped and displaced by the Bosnian Serb army, the UN 
peacekeepers were not authorized by the Security Council to use weapons, not even in 
cases when some of them were killed and many others were  taken hostage.  There were 
about 5,000 French and British peacekeepers in Bosnia and both of the countries feared 
Serb revenge against their troops. They also believed that eventually the Vance-Owen 
peace plan would make the Bosnian Serbs even more hostile.
67
 In many occasions the 
UN peacekeepers witnessed crimes by Bosnian Serbs against Muslims throughout the 
war. Even the Bosnian officials such as the deputy prime minister, who was under the 
care of UN forces, was killed by Bosnian Serbs. The Secretary General had proclaimed 
that the member states has decided to provide troops to UNPROFOR based on the 
existing Security Council resolution, which stated that the mandate of the Force would be 
implemented as a peacekeeping operation and not as peacemaking.   
As UNPROFOR managed to put the Sarajevo airport back into operation, its main 
task was to distribute humanitarian aid. However, they often failed to properly dispense it 
to the Bosnian civilians as their convoys were harmed and aid was confiscated. Indeed, 
aid distributed to the safe areas only kept the civilians alive until the Serbian aggressor 
would eventually kill them.  It also helped to feed and supply the fighters and mainly the 
Bosnian Serbs, who frequently attacked the humanitarian convoy and robbed them. As a 
                                                          
67
 Power, Samantha. A problem From Hell, Basic Books, 2002.  pp. 304-305 
37 
 
result, the UN peacekeepers were criticized by reporters and in particular by American 
reporters for prolonging the war in Bosnia. Misha Glennny who witnessed a chronicle of 
events that took place in the Bosnian war stated in her book “I see people queuing 
listlessly for bread. The Serb forces confiscate any food-aid destined to Sarajevo. One 
day I go to the airport to see the UN take delivery of twelve tons of food. The UN arrived 
but the food is already gone.” 
68
 
The war became even more extreme when on May 5, 1993 General Ratko Mladic 
became commander of the Bosnian Serb army. “The event was preceded and followed by 
an escalation of violence all over Bosnia. On May 18 a Red Cross relief convoy was 
shelled on the outskirt of Sarajevo. On May 22, a UN convoy was hijacked. On May 24, 
the village of Kozarac, in Banja Luka region, was overrun by Serbs and its inhabitants 
massacred.”
69
 The UN troops had very little control over the distribution of humanitarian 
aid and no control or authority over the conflict occurring between the ethnicities. So at 
this point they were very week at handling the situation and could not manage to save the 
civilians from the aggression.  
Another failure of UNPROFOR happened when the Security Council decided to 
declare a no-fly zone over the territory of Bosnia.  The peacekeepers were authorized to 
only monitor the banned fly zone, but not to take any action against those that flew over 
it.  Until 1993, the no-fly zone rule was violated many times as the UN monitored about 
465 violations in the area. As a consequence, the UN managed later on to adapt a 
resolution which allowed all members to reinforce the UN’s role in the no-fly zone. The 
operation was then handed over to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which 
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for some time was not able to completely restrict all the violations.  However, in many 
cases it succeeded in punishing the violators. 
Although, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR’s mandate in Bosnia a couple 
of times, it did not get any back up from other countries which were not willing to send 
their troops in the war.  As the war got more intense the UN intended to handle crimes 
against the larger civilian communities by creating the so called “safe areas” in the towns 
of Bihac, Gorzade, Sarajevo, Strebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa where most of refugees had 
settled. These enclaves were made up by many local inhabitants and refugees who settled 
there when Serb forces ethnically cleansed the nearby regions.
70
 Yet, the definition of the 
safe areas was not very clear, because the resolutions issued by the UN Security Council 
only declared that the safe areas would be protected from attacks and that the Bosnian 
Serb forces be withdrawn to a further distance from where they would not be able to 
threaten the civilians of the enclaves; though they never moved a step back. UNPROFOR 
together with humanitarian agencies were allowed free access to these enclaves.  
As a consequence, UNPROFOR’s most disputed operation came during their 
mandate in the safe areas.  After UNPROFOR troops were deployed to the safe areas the 
situation became even more complicated. The international community as well as the 
Bosnian civilians believed that now the safe areas were in safe hands and finally the 
inhabitants of those areas would be protected and supplied with humanitarian aid without 
any barrier, and possibly be transferred from there. Unfortunately, this could not be easily 
achieved.  Besides the difficulty of delivering humanitarian relief supplies, moving 
civilians out of enclaves was no accepted by the international community, as it would 
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mean to participate in ethnic cleansing, or by the Bosnian Muslim government, which 
used the safe areas politically to raise more attention internationally.
71
 
As for protection, UNPROFOR was very poorly armed its strength could not even be 
compared to that of Bosnian Serb army.  Even though some UN members agreed to 
establish the safe areas in Bosnia, they constantly hesitated to provide the means that 
would actually make the areas safe. “The allies were unwilling to provide additional 
military resources and repeated their concern that the safe havens would suck them into a 
long-drawn-out war with the Serbs”. 
72
Though, some of the members of the Security 
Council, in particular Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela supported the proposal for 
reinforcing the UN’s presence in the protected zone. Eventually, these countries wanted 
the proposal to lead to UN military intervention assisting the Bosnian Muslims.  
However, most of the members of the Security Council disagreed with their statement. 
The countries, such as Britain, France and Spain whose troops were already involved in 
the Bosnian war would not to be persuaded to get into a war with Serbs by the member 
states which were not contributing peacekeepers in the Bosnia. Despite the fact that in 
1993 the UN requested additional 34,000 troops from the member states to be deployed 
in the safe areas, the Netherland was the only Western UN member state to confidently 
respond to the Secretariat’s demand for troops in implementing the Security Council safe 
area resolution. However, until 1994 the Dutch were to not able join UNPROFOR 
because they were not prepared to meet the UN requirements. 
73
 
The Council invited the UN Secretary General Boutras Ghali and the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata to discuss the possibility of 
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strengthening the UN involvement in the safe areas in order to promote the situation 
there. Almost immediately, after the discussion Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, the co-
chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) warned 
about the risk of further involvement of the UN troops in the area. They proclaimed that 
the safe area would be “safe” only if Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government would 
agree on creating them.   
 
As a result, the UN was unable to provide a full deployment of UNPROFOR troops in the 
safe areas, a condition which favored of the Bosnian Serb army as their shelling in the 
protected areas would be even easier with fewer UN peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs 
essentially ignored the UN declaration of the safe areas and started cleansing the Muslims 
ethnically.  When the safe areas came under heavy Serbian attacks,  the UN reacted by 
requesting the withdrawal of heavy weapons, however, even in January 1994 when the 
NATO forces started  bombing the Bosnian Serb’s  military centers, an attack on the 
Sarajevo market killed 68 Muslim civilians. As a result NATO demanded a 20km 
weapons exclusion zone which the Serbs complied with.  Regardless of NATO air strikes 
against the Bosnian Serb forces, the Sarajevo attack was followed by other massive 
attacks, such as that of Gorazde, Bihac, Zepa, and finally Strebrenica where the worst 
massacre of civilians occurred since World War II. On one day about 8,000 Muslims, 
men and boys, were mercilessly killed in Strebrenica by the Bosnian Serbs.
74
After this 
catastrophic genocide took place, the international community really started to express 
their empathy for the victims. Particularly, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Larry Hollingsworth showed his sorrowful emotions about the killed noncombatants by 
                                                          
74
Rogel, C. The Breakup of Yugoslavia, pp. 65-67 
41 
 
stating “I hope the military commanders who ordered the firing on Srebrenica burns in 
the hottest corner of hell……. {Those} who loaded the weapons and fired the shells-I 
hope they have nightmares forever more, I hope their sleep is punctuated by the screams 




Additionally, in revenge of the NATO bombing, the Bosnian Serbs took more than 360 
UNPROFOR troops as hostages,
76
 thus indicating that the UN peacekeepers were not 
even able to defend themselves. Some of the main reasons why UNPROFOR failed to 
halt the genocide from occurring include:  Firstly, as mentioned earlier there were 
insufficient troops, especially in the safe areas to provide humanitarian protection.  As the 
situation worsened in the safe areas the UN military commanders there requested a much 
higher number of troops.  However, their voices were ignored by the rest of the world.  
“Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a former president of Poland acting on behalf of the UN who had 
proposed and defended the havens idea, resigned in protest when the UN failed to defend 
the safe areas when they came under attack  in 1995.”
77
 In many cases the Dutch 
commanders demanded warning air strikers from French but their request was delayed. 
Also the UN troops who remained outside could not take the risk to threatening the Serbs 
as they would put in the UN hostages’ lives in danger.  Secondly, the UN mission in 
Bosnia faced financial difficulties as the UN member states were not contributing 
enough. Thirdly, the majority of the UN members were not willing to get UN troops 
involved deeper in the Bosnian war. Not only they feared failure, which they had 
experienced in Rwanda and Somalia but also because there were disagreements on the 
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Security Council on how to solve the conflict in Bosnia.  It was not until the end of 1995 
that the members of the Security Council could come up with a unanimous decision.  
 
Other means of the UN contribution during the war in Bosnia.  
Besides the creation and the deployment of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia there were 
other actions taken by the UN during the conflict. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) contributed to the war by delivering humanitarian 
aid and care for refugees. It faced many difficulties during its mission in Bosnia as there 
was a very large number of war torn civilians to care for. The devastating war had 
generated the greatest number of refugees and displaced persons in Europe since World 
War II.  For the most part, UNHCR kept the number of victims remarkably low, 
especially during the cold winters. Another effort taken by the UN Security Council in 
promoting justice in former Yugoslavian countries was the establishment of the (ICTY) 
in 1993. Its main task is to deal with war crimes that took place in the 20
th
 century in the 
Balkans. In collaboration with the EC the UN also organized an International Conference 
in the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) in London in 1992. Its main purpose was to promote 





The ICFY difficulties in achieving a cease-fire in Bosnia came primarily as a result of its 
late involvement in the conflict. The ICFY’s co-chairmen were Cyrus Vance, 
representing the UN and Lord David Owen, representing the EC.  Though in 1993, they 
undertook intensive diplomatic negotiations with the representatives of Bosnian Serbs, 
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Croats and Muslims their plan, the Vance-Owen plan was not accepted by all the 
conflicting parties. Thus Vance was replaced by Thorvald Stolenberg, who failed to 
convince the parties to come to a common agreement as well. Not, even the Contact 
Group of 1994 managed to settle peace in Bosnia. It was not until late 1995 that a 




The plans were rejected by the conflicting parties for the following reasons. First, there 
was not enough pressure by the international community to push them to accept the peace 
plans. Though, Lord Owen had threatened the Muslims a couple of times in the peace 
conferences by claiming that if they did not accept the plans the UN peacekeepers would 
withdraw and that the Bosnian Muslims would not be assisted by the international 
community anymore; there were  no cases where the Bosnian Serbs were pushed hard to 
accept the plans. Second, at the beginning of the conflict the Bosnian Serbs had occupied 
about 70 percent of the Bosnian territory and “cleansed” the Muslims and the Croats from 
the area. So even though efforts were made by the UN diplomats to deal with the issue, 
the Bosnian Serbs would not accept any plan that would require the distribution of the 
land sizeded by them. Third, some of the plans were unacceptable by the Bosnian Muslim 
government because they would not agree on any partition of the country.  
 
Even though the international community was aware of the crimes committed by Serbian 
oppressors against the civilians of Croatia and Slovenia during their fight for 
independence, and the Serbian “ethnic cleansing” war policy, first implemented in 
Croatia, from the beginning of the war in Bosnia they agreed not to use military forces in 
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the territory. Instead they preferred peaceful means such as diplomatic negotiations, and 
humanitarian operations. The majority of the UN Security Council members referred to 
the Bosnia war as a civil war, where all three conflicting parties were blamed equally for 
the war.  Despite the fact the media around the world showed and reported on massive 
civilian atrocities and devastating conditions and treatment of thousands of Bosnian 
Muslim and Croat detainees in the camps controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, the UN major 
states took no serious action to support a cease-fire until the establishment of the Dayton 
accords in 1995. “As late as summer 1995, when Srebrenica was “cleansed” of its 
Muslims, the powers still failed to act. They continued to treat the Bosnia situation as a 
humanitarian crisis, sending food to feed the hungry, while looking the other way when it 
came to identifying and punishing those responsible for the crime.” 
80
 After the war 
finally came to an end late 1995, world politicians and analysts heavily criticized the UN 
and U.S for their ineffective  war policies in the early stages of the Bosnian conflict by 
claiming that, 
The United Nations did not respond in a timely manner to early reports 
from the field about atrocities in the prison camps. The US state 
department also had early reports of killing associated with the forcible 
transfer of populations but did not follow up on the report. The failure to 
report reflects systematic defects in the way the international community 
and the United States monitor human rights crises. Had the world 
community focused earlier on the atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, many 
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 Even though the U.S was politically involved in the war through its diplomats there, in 
the beginning of the war it strongly opposed military intervention in Bosnia. As it feared 
that if the UN intervenes military the U.S would have to send troops as well. President 
Bush stated that “American boys should not die for Bosnia.”
82
 In the early stages of the 
war the U.S policymakers claimed that the war did not threaten American national 
interests, thus it was not in their interests to get involved.  Another important thing to 
note about the U.S role in the war was that, the Cold War had ended just a few years 
before the breakup of Yugoslavia, thus at the time the US officials worried about 
offending the Russians, who sympathized with the Orthodox Christian Serbs.  
 
Decisions and opinions of members of the Security Council, especially the permanent 
ones, contradicted in that the U.S tried to be more active in political negotiations mainly 
in 1994. It also pushed the international community to lift the sanctions against Bosnia 
and use air forces to bomb the Serb positions there, particularly those located around the 
safe areas.  However, countries such as United Kingdom, France and Canada, which 
contributed the greatest number of troops to Bosnia, did not accept this idea because they 
did not want to endanger the peacekeepers lives.  Also the UN commanders found it 
difficult to implement the resolutions recommended by the U.S without putting in danger 
their ability to function as peacekeepers. Thus the UN officials attempt to combine 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Bosnia was catastrophic. 
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If the Western powers had been more serious about preventing the genocide in Bosnia, 
they could have at least occupied Sarajevo and the territories around it in order to protect 
the airport from artillery attack. They could have also succeeded in delivering sufficient 
humanitarian aid through Croatia since the two countries are close neighbors. In addition  
if willing, with the backup of the U.S, NATO forces could have attacked the Bosnian 
Serbs’ military bases without endangering UN peacekeepers’ lives, by shelling the hills 
around Sarajevo to stop  the Serbs, positioned on the hills, from attacking Sarajevo and 
from hijacking humanitarian relief. Another advantage would have been to bomb Serb 
military and industrial targets in the Bosnian Serb territory, or even within Serbia in order 




NATO air strikes in Bosnia  
In order for NATO to start its operation in Bosnia it needed UN authorization. After 
UNPROFOR’s failure to protect the safe areas and after the UN troops frequently were 
attacked by the Bosnian Serbs, the United States and the NATO Secretary General 
Manfred Woerner pushed the UN Secretary General to request NATO to use air strikes in 
Bosnia. In the meanwhile, the U.S had worked out arrangements with the Russians, Serb 
protectors. Also France was willing to join the NATO military operations. The U.S 
seemed to be motivated mainly by the desire to show its ability in leading NATO, as well 
as its wish to bring the Bosnia genocide to an end. 
 
Following the Strebrenica massacre, all UNPROFOR were ordered to withdraw from 
Bosnian Serb held enclaves, making it easier for NATO to launch heavy air strikes.  On 
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August 1, 1995, the contact group mediators of U.S, French and British warned the 
Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic that NATO would respond to any Serb attack on the 
UN safe areas.  The French and the British by this time most of their troops had pulled 
out-encouraged the U.S to use air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. NATO officers even 
suggested that “The plan is to bomb the crap out of them. The idea would be to make it 
something the Serbs would never, ever, want to experience.” 
84
 However, on August 28, 
1995, Serbs convinced that they could do whatever they wanted in Bosnia, and if 
threatened,  they would get worse, attacked a market place in Sarajevo and killed 37 
people and wounded 85.  President Clinton knew that the Serbs were increasing their 
attacks in order to make the UN peacekeepers pulled out, thus he wanted to send the 
20,000 U.S forces that he had promised to Bosnia before the UN pulls out completely.  
His administration committed itself to emerging a serious working strategy, since the 
failure in Bosnia was hurting U.S foreign policy.  As a result, Richard Holbrooke was 
appointed as the US mediator to Bosnia. As assistant secretary of state for Europe and 
Canada, he had proclaimed that the war in Bosnia would be ended through the use of 
force. Holbrooke now could play a major role in NATO forces and could use all air 
powers, if necessary against the Bosnian Serb forces. Given that General Mladic, though 
under intensive pressure, refused to withdraw his heavy weapons from Sarajevo, NATO 
air strikes continued for two weeks. Holbrooke also assisted the Bosnian Muslims and 
Croats in capturing back territory occupied by Bosnian Serbs during the war. Within two 
weeks the territory controlled by them raised from 28% to more than 50%.
85
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After continuous NATO bombing on the Bosnian Serb military bases, Serb leaders 
realized that they could not resist the NATO forces anymore and this time they were 
persuaded, especially by Milosevic who wanted the sanctions in his country to be lifted, 
that it was time for a cease-fire and for peaceful talks. In fact, towards the end of the war, 
Milosevic was put under pressure from the Russians, who play a major role in the 
Security Council, to accept the peace agreements. On the other hand he was under 
intensive pressure by Bosnian Serb military leaders who did not want to withdraw from 
the occupied areas. Nevertheless, all this trouble between the Serbs and the Russians, and 
the heavy NATO bombing finally forced the Bosnian Serb leaders to accept proposals for 
a peaceful settlement.  
 
Holbrooke and his team held intensive rounds of peace negotiations with the Serbian 
President Milosevic, Croatian President Tudjam and Bosnian President Izetbegovic for 
twenty-one days in Wright-Patterson air force in Dayton, Ohio. As a result, on December 
14, 1995, all three parties declared and signed a peace agreement known as Dayton 
accords. 
86
Although the UN representatives had managed to conduct all previous peace 
negotiations, the final peace agreement was not reached with the UN assistance or under 
its supervision. Finally, the U.S had demonstrated that a combined use of force and 
diplomatic negotiations would produce a peaceful settlement. The Bosnian government 
had started the war unprepared and unorganized. The leaders placed their faith in the 
international community which, they thought would not stand by and observe a European 
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country, recognized by most of the countries of the world and newly admitted as a 
sovereign member of the UN, be destroyed so badly.  
 
UN role in preserving the peace in Bosnia after the war 
Following, the signing of the Dayton Accords, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1031, which authorized NATO to deploy in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Implementation 
force(IFOR), made up of about 60,000 troops, in order to implement the peace agreement 
there.
87
 The IFOR’s most important duty was to ensure the withdrawal and departure of 
all heavy artilleries and military forces and to ensure protection of the refugees. IFOR’s 
mandate in Bosnia ended after a year, thus the UN Security Council authorized the 
Stabilization force (SFOR) to further stabilize the situation in the awake of the war. All 
the parties had promised full cooperation in the implementation of the peace plan.  In 
order to monitor the implementation of the civilian law enforcement, and train new law 
enforcement employees and assist in other related cases, the UN created the International 
Police Task Force (IPTF), which succeeded in fulfilling their mission for the most part. 
One of the most important entities created by the UN was the High Representative, 
whose task was to supervise and coordinate all civilian actions of the peace agreement 
implementation. In fact, the High Representative was the final authority to oversee the 
civilian implementation of the peace agreement.  In order to ensure full implementation 
of the peace settlement, the UN Security Council provided the High Representative with 
full legitimate powers. 
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UNMIBH’s success in carrying out its mandate in Bosnia. 
 
Proud of UNMIBH’s success in completing its mandate, the UN Secretary General 
announced at the end of UNMIBH’s mandate in 2002: “Through UMNIBH, the United 
Nations had demonstrated its ability to complete a complex mandate in accordance with a 
strategic plan and within a realistic and finite time frame. UNIMBH has completed the 
most extensive police reform and restructuring project ever undertaken by the United 
Nations.” 
88
 UNMIHB was established in December 1995. In order to achieve a 
successful mission in the post-war, the UNMIBH was led by the Special Representative 
of the Secretary General and the Coordinator of the UN operations in Bosnia. He was in 
charge of supervising the IPTF Police Commissioner and also to coordinate all other 
UN’s operations in Bosnia.
89
 The mission had spread its offices and activities all over the 
ruined parts of  Bosnia, where it had established effective units and offices, such as the 
Criminal Justice Advisory Unit, the Civil Affairs Unit, the Human Rights Office and the 
Public Affairs Office, in order to bring back to life every single civil and political 
institution. All of the UNMIBH institutions were implemented effectively and in 
accordance with the UN Secretary Council’s resolutions. After the deployment of IFOR, 
the UN had to assist only in implementing the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement.  
Its main task was to contribute to the creation and the implementation of the rule of law. 
It also aimed to step by step assist Bosnia in reconstructing and operating all its 
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governmental institutions. It helped reform and reconstruct the local offices, including 
police forces, judicial system and social and economic services. 
 
At the end of the UNIBH’s mandate in 2002, the Secretary-General issued his final report 
on UNMIBH to the Security Council, where he provided an overview of the 
accomplishments of the Mission. One of the essential questions to take into consideration 
is; what are some main factors that caused UNPROFOR to end up so deeply unsuccessful 
during its mission? And what are some factors that caused UNMIBH to success in 
fulfilling its mandate during the Bosnian past-war? Some of the factors include: 
 Collaboration of the UN member states; unlike throughout the war, all UN 
members states were concerned about the Bosnia’s post-war reconstruction and 
stabilization, where they closely followed the reestablishment process.  
 General security condition; obviously in any humanitarian undertakings, it is 
much easier to efficiently operate in peace time. Thus for UNMIBH to achieve its 
goal was not so difficult since all the warning parties had signed the peace 
agreement and also the peacekeeping was performed by IFOR and SFOR troops.  
 Various expectations of the international community; many people around the 
world saw UNPROFOR as a peace enforcement entity, the UN Secretary General 
often complained that majority of the international community and the Bosnian 
government expected the UNPROFOR to get involved in the armed clashes, 
which the Security Council would  have never approved. Thus the expectations of 
the international community were never met and this caused the UNPROFOR’s 
total unpopularity. Whereas for UNMIBH the expectations were not so high, as 
52 
 
more weight was put on the IFOR, SFOR and the High Representative, whose 
task was to implement military means.  
 
UN’s efforts in prosecuting the perpetrators  
 
Besides diplomatic negotiations, whether or not effective, in 1993 the UN Security 
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), in order to deal with war crimes that occurred in the former Yugoslavian 
republics during the 1990s. The ICTY is the first international war crimes court created 
by the UN, for the purpose of bringing to trial the perpetrators accused of acts of murder, 





President Slobodan Milosevic was one of the accused leaders for atrocities that took 
place during the collapse of former Yugoslavia, where more than 100,000 people were 
killed and millions displaced.  In 2001, he was captured and brought to The Hague for 
trial in the ICTY, where he died during the process of investigation.
91
 From its 
establishment the ICTY has charged 60 people for crimes committed against various 
ethnicities in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia.
92
Both of 
the Bosnian Serb war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratco Mladic were accused of  
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Bosnian genocide and in particular the Strebrenica massacre. After many years of 
evasion, they were arrested by Serbian authorities and transferred to the ICTY for trial. 
The main purpose of the UN Security Council in establishing the Tribunal was to deter 
future war crimes and to bring justice to thousands of victims and their families, therefore 




In General, the UN’s presence in Bosnian and Herzegovina showed to the world both the 
unwillingness and the willingness of action of world leaders.  Although UNPROFOR’s 
mission was mainly unsuccessful, the UN still continued to acknowledge itself as an 
operative security organization when it came to taking care of the returning refugees after 
the war and rebuilding Bosnia politically and economically. In contrast, UNMIBH 
proved the strength and authority of the UN in accomplishing its mission in Bosnia in 
reconstructing and stabilizing the country. Though, the war was catastrophic and lasted 
for almost five years, since UNMIBH left Bosnia in 2002 there is not a recorded single 
incident between the ethnicities there. Nevertheless, the UN has to rethink the concept of 
the peacekeeping, especially when it comes to ethnic wars and it should react faster and 









NATO INVOLVEMENT in KOSOVO 
An Intervention without Security Council’s Authorization 
Chapter five 
As Mr. Annan wrote: 
The Kosovo conflict has prompted a wide debate of profound importance 
to the resolution of conflicts. The sovereign states who drafted the Charter 
over a half century ago knew that there are times when the use of force 
may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace. That is why the Charter's own 





NATO bombed the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for 78 days from the 
24th of March 1999 till 10
th 
of June 1999. The reason was the continuing atrocities and 
ethnic cleansing carried out by the Serbian authorities against the Kosovo- Albanian 
population
94
 and the stated purpose the termination of such a humanitarian catastrophe. Its 
legal status became the subject of much debate.  Use of force by one or more States against 
another sovereign State is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter save in 
two cases: self-defence under Article 51, and when the Security Council has authorized the 
resort to force under Article 42 of the Charter.  Article 51 has been accepted as customary 
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law and thus it is invocable by all States. In the case of NATO’s self-defence, NATO’s 
Secretary General Javier Solana said:  
Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and 
violence against the civilian population in Kosovo… We must halt the 
violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding 




 The remaining option was the Security Council's authorization in the form of a Chapter 
VII Resolution
96
 that had to be passed by its Members without any of the Five Permanent 
Members vetoing it. That Resolution was never issued and permission was never sought 
in the first place, although in theory Mr Annan recommended that: 
When forceful intervention becomes necessary, the Security Council 
must be able to rise to the challenge. The choice must not be between 
Council unity and inaction in the face of genocide, as in the case of 
Rwanda, on the one hand; and Council division, with regional action, as in 
the case of Kosovo, on the other. In both cases, the Member States of the 
United Nations should have been able to find common ground in 
upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defense of our 
common humanity. As important as the Council's enforcement power is its 
deterrent power. If states bent on criminal behavior know that 
frontiers are not an absolute; if they know that the Security Council 
will take action to halt crimes against humanity, then they will not 
embark on such a course of action in expectation of sovereign 
impunity.  
Although these few facts might represent NATO as a militarily powerful organization 
that considers legal technicalities as trivial and avoidable, the situation requires a 
complete and accurate assessment.  It had to be a choice, between taking an action whose 
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legality would be questioned but which would serve the laudable purpose of saving 
human lives and ending the inhumane and degrading treatment, on one side and, 
compliance with sovereignty rights in international law which would have allowed a 
further enhancement of a flagrant breach of fundamental human rights, on the other. 
 
 Kosovo, a Short History  
The history between Serbs and Kosovo - Albanians
97
 is known to start with the 1389 
battle of Kosovo Polje.
98
 However, for the purposes of this thesis, it will be discussed 
Kosovo as a case of humanitarian intervention, leaving apart the historical debate. 
It can be said that Kosovo was among the territories acquired by Serbia after its first 
enlargement as a result of the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913. The degree of territorial 
and political autonomy given to Kosovo (and other Provinces) by Marshall Tito in 1974 
was taken away by Slobodan Milosevic who had come to power in 1985 and had based a 
substantial part of his political success on a rage of nationalism against the 
“Albanization” of the region.
99
 In March 1989, he imposed martial law (with serious 
legal irregularities), which put Kosovo under the direct rule of Serbia. The 
implementation of this law was based firmly on the systematic violation of human rights 
in the form of killing, torture and arbitrary arrests and imprisonment.
100
   
This provoked the creation of a "shadow state" with parallel state institutions which 
managed to run an unofficial, but very telling referendum on the political status of the 
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Province. The referendum concluded in favor of the "Republic of Kosovo" asking for 
independence and the status of a republic within a federation retaining the right of 
secession. This was later confirmed with the 1992 "underground elections" which was 
followed in 1996 by the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare e 
Kosoves) an army which shared some characteristics with  clandestine guerrilla groups 
and had taken upon itself the goal of Kosovo's liberation. The continuous objection of the 
international community to Kosovo’s plea of self-determination
101
 in support of its 
independence, led to  violence deployed by the KLA against Serbs, and as a result caused 
the Security Council to condemn expressly in Resolution 1160(1998): 
the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and 
peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual and all external 





The appeal to take their destiny into their own hands was surely emphasized by the 
Dayton negotiations in 1995 from which the Kosovo cause expected some redress but 
was in fact clearly excluded.   The Dayton Agreement dealt with the situation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and was signed in Paris in 14 December 1995 after three weeks of 
negotiations, four years of atrocities carried out on the Bosnian Population by the Serb 
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authorities, the disappointing role of the UN and other international and regional 
organisations and the systematic failure of previous agreements and peace plans, as 
mentioned in previous chapter, provided a framework of constitutional, peace-building 
and enforcement measures.
102
 It made specific reference to the Protection of Human 
Rights in Annex 6 "Agreement of Human Rights” and provided for a constitutional 
reversal of ethnic cleansing
103
 in Annex 7 when addressing the issue of refugees and 
displaced persons. The Agreement was concluded in the presence of the five Members of 
the Contact Group and the European Union's Special Negotiator, by the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Kosovo was part of the latter and had already been subjected to gross human 
right violations for six years since Milosevic had come to power in 1989. The non-violent 
way of resistance chosen by its self-proclaimed President, Ibrahim Rugova relied on a 
potential diplomatic solution, but had also proved unsuccessful. The disappointment 
following Kosovo's exclusion from the Dayton negotiations and the recognition of 
‘Republika Srpska’ territory, part of which was acquired as a result of ethnic cleansing 
against the Bosnians, only ripened the conditions for the creation of the KLA. However, 
in previous talks on the issue of Kosovo, although technically speaking an internal matter 
of Serbia, were raised as highly relevant to the region, but to no practical avail.
104
  The 
Kosovo -Albanians didn’t settle for autonomy and the Serbs didn’t have any intention to 
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grant even a minimal degree of autonomy.  Thus, inserting Kosovo's cause into the 
Dayton negotiations could have prejudiced the very immediate cause of the talks because 
Milosevic had expressed with consistency that Kosovo was an internal issue for Serbia, 
and he was too important to that process to be subjected to further challenges given 
possible adverse consequences. The international community couldn’t afford this, after 
the lengthy history of the failure of diplomacy and a strong pattern of humanitarian 
catastrophe in Bosnia. Kosovo constituted the basis for another humanitarian catastrophe 
in the future
105
 and, was even correctly foreseen by some of the international negotiators 
as the future undoing of Milosevic.
106
 Still, preventing the accelerating crisis in Kosovo 
was seen by some as a luxury when compared with the need for an immediate solution to 
the situation in Bosnia.  The benefit of such a pragmatic approach,
107
 nonetheless, would 
only be short-term. . It did not cure the region's wounds, it only isolated them 
temporarily. 
Events between 31 March 1998 and 23 March 1999 
 
The Security Council issued the first Resolution to respond to the massive violations in 
Kosovo in March 1998    (Res. 1160
108
) followed by an arms embargo on the FRY, 
concurrently suggesting diplomatic negotiations between the two parties in conflict to 
decide upon the  "political status issues" which would ideally result in a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute. 
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However, the resolution made it clear that independence was out of the question. “The 
Security Council expresses its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which would 




Even so, ethnic cleansing did not stop. On the contrary, it intensified to a point where 
even the International Committee of Red Cross had to abandon the region. As the 
Secretary General himself pointed out, "collateral damage" had grown into appalling 





 of September, the Security Council issued resolution 1199 and called again 
for immediate termination of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire in Kosovo.
111
  
It also addressed the immediate need to improve the humanitarian situation and the need 
for unconditional dialogue with international involvement. 
 
In October 1998, NATO’s intention of resort to force became clearer by issuing an order 
for military intervention in response to the Serb actions in Kosovo. A temporary 
suspension of the order occurred as a result of a package deal reached between the US 
special envoy Richard Holbrooke and the Yugoslav Government, which promised the 
withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from the territory of the province and the presence of an 
international monitoring scheme, which would supervise the implementation of that 
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agreement. NATO meanwhile had achieved an agreement with Belgrade on an air 




Both agreements were endorsed in the Security Council Resolution 1203 of 24 October 
1998, once again under Chapter VII.  During this time the Kosovo political leaders and 
the Yugoslav government were offered the draft of a peace plan by the US negotiator for 
Kosovo, Christopher Hill. Both Parties refused it, even in its third version. The 
decentralization of public power and its distribution mainly to local authorities did not 
suit either the Kosovo leadership who were seeking a central government, or the Serbs 
who were preaching equality for all ethnic groups which  meant political marginalization 
for the almost absolute majority of 90 per cent of Albanians in the region. 
 
Atrocities resumed once again. The international community called for respect for the 




Afterwards there were two turning points that preceded the commencement of the 
bombing: The Racak massacre and the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations.  
On 15 January 1999, in the village of Racak 45 ethnic Albanians were slaughtered 
114
 by 
FRY and Serbian forces. Some of the victims were women and children and at least one 
of them was decapitated.  As a result, 5,500 people fled the village.  
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In a Presidential Statement of 19 January 1999, the Security Council condemned the 
massacre and called for: “…an urgent need and full investigation of the facts and urgently 
calls for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to work with the International Tribunal for 




The statement continued with deploring the FRY’s aggravating actions in declaring the 
head of the Kosovo Mission Verification, William Walker persona non-grata (decision 
which was suspended) and the FRY’s refusal of access to the ICTY Prosecutor Louise 
Arbour. Tension escalated rapidly. The High Commissioner for Refugees, Ogata 
expressing horror at the killings in Racak stated: 
The Racak killings have caused tension in other villages and our staff 
report that in areas near the conflict zone women and children are moving 
out to stay with relatives in villages farther south.”
116
 And that: “Renewed 
fighting since Christmas Eve has forced more than 20,000 people to flee at 
least 23 villages in the municipalities of Decane, Podujevo, Stimlje, and 





The Rambouillet Round 
 
If you want peace you must prepare for war.
118
 The Rambouillet talks aimed at a political 
settlement
119
 and were initiated under much pressure on 6 February 1999. The Contact 
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Group managed to secure an interim settlement on the autonomy of Kosovo, which 
would formally be under FRY control, but practically would enjoy almost all the 
important characteristics of a sovereign State. The Rambouillet Agreement envisaged 
NATO' s military presence in the territory of Serbia as an enabler of the area's 
demilitarisation, which would be gradually replaced by Kosovo's own police forces while 
the role of the Serb police and armed forces would be kept to a minimum. The 
implementation and monitoring of the Agreement would be assigned to NATO and 
OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).  
  
The agreement was finally signed by the Kosovo Albanian delegation, but the Serbian 
representatives refused with the justification that the suggested military presence of 
NATO or any other foreign entity in the territory of Serbia would infringe the sovereignty 
of the latter.  During the talks, the Serbian diplomatic resistance was vividly associated 
with further massacres, attacks on villages in the region of Podujeve and forced 
displacement of thousands of Albanians. All this was taking place in mid –March and by 
the end of the month the OSCE had to evacuate its verification mission. 
 
NATO Intervention 
The failure of the Rambouillet talks, the unsuccessful attempts by Richard Holbrooke in 
Belgrade, and the systematic dismissal of NATO's ultimatums made NATO's Secretary 
General Javier Solana authorise the initiation of the military attacks against the FRY. The 




operation under NATO's command started on 24 March 1999 with the air bombardment 
of military targets in the FRY. The whole operation lasted 78 days and was based entirely 
on air attacks, intelligence operations and the threat of ground troops
120
 based in countries 
neighbouring Yugoslavia. Two days after the bombing started, Russia proposed a draft 
resolution to condemn the operation as breaching the United Nations Charter Provisions 
(Article 2(4), 24 and 53) and suggested that NATO’s action should be categorized as an 
Article 39 threat to international peace and security.  This was defeated by twelve votes 
to three, the supporting countries being Russia, China and Namibia. On 2 June 1999, the 
International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Legality of Use of Force refused 
the request of the FRY for provisional measures to put an immediate stop to NATO’s 
action. The reason was the failure of the FRY to establish that the Court had jurisdiction 
in all the cases.
121
 
 In May, the G8 terms of settlement were accepted by the FRY. The adoption of 
Resolution 1244(1999) which contained principles set by the European Union and the 
Russian envoys on ending violence and withdrawing all FRY forces from Kosovo 
marked the end of the conflict.  
 NATO and the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
In humanitarian intervention doctrine, first of all the scale of the humanitarian crisis must 
be assessed and how that affects international peace and security. Second the purpose of 
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the intervention and its potential effects must be analysed and third, the use of force 
would be carried out with particular reference to the extent of the force used, and its 
necessity, the length of the operation, and the existence of alternative solutions. 
1) Was Kosovo becoming a humanitarian catastrophe?  
The Prosecutor of ICTY stated in her Press Release of 10 March 1998
122
 that the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY is ongoing and would cover "the current violence in Kosovo." 
On the 31 March of the same year the Security Council in paragraph 17 of the Resolution 
1160, asked the Prosecutor to "begin gathering information related to the violence in 
Kosovo that may fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction."
123
In October 1998, Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan on his report, on human rights stated:  
“the scope and the intensity of the conflict in Kosovo grew dramatically while human 
rights situation deteriorated…Serious human rights abuses were being reported on a daily 
basis throughout the summer and early autumn.”
124
   
Also he confirmed in his Report of 17 March 1999 (after the massacre of Racak had 
occurred) that: "The Humanitarian and human rights situation in Kosovo remains 
grave"
125
. The General Assembly in Resolution 53/164 of 9 December 1998 condemned 
strongly "…the overwhelming number of human rights violations committed by the 
authorities of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), including summary executions, 
indiscriminate and wide spread attacks on civilians…mass forced displacement of 
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civilians…torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach on 
International humanitarian Law”. 
2) Was Kosovo a threat to International Peace? 
In the Kosovo case, an intervention on the basis of self-defence under Article 51
126
 was 
not justifiable and indeed, was never invoked by NATO. As Kosovo was part of the 
Republic of Serbia, which itself is part of Former Republic of Yugoslavia the conflict 
was confined to the territorial borders of a sole State and Article 2(7) prohibits such an 
intervention: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State…” 
Furthermore, NATO was under a duty not to intervene in the civil strife of a State.  
Regional agencies do have a role in resolving international conflicts, but the Charter is 
explicit in making their role subsidiary to Security Council’s primary responsibility.  
Article 53, paragraph 1 states that: "the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize 
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority…" 
 Even military intervention has been contemplated by the regional agencies, for example, 
under Article 51 on self-defence, that action cannot be taken unless authorized by the 
Security Council which has the primary responsibility
127
 to preserve or restore collective 
peace and security.  : "…But no enforcement action shall be taken without the 
authorization of the Security Council…"  
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An additional problem was Article V of the Treaty of Washington
128
, which limits 
NATO's right to collective self-defence to its members and their territorial integrity, but 
not beyond. However, the then Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott referred to 
'common interest' and stated that:"  
 
… As we maintain our ability to defend the territorial integrity of all 
NATO members, we also need forces, doctrines and communication assets 
that will allow us, when necessary, to address the challenges of ethnic 
strife and regional conflict that directly affect our security but that lie 





3) What was the purpose; humanitarian or Western power interest?  
One of Brownlie’s suggestions was that in the case brought against NATO’s Members on 
the Legality of the Use of Force “The Command structure of NATO constituted an 
instrumentality of the respondent States, acting as their agent.”
130
  One suggestion was 
that NATO's intervention was needed as a means of strengthening the organization's 
credibility,
131
whereas, on 23 March 1999, Bill Clinton addressing his nation declared: 
Our strikes have three objectives: to show determination of NATO to 
oppose aggression: to stop President Milosevic attacks on civilians: and 
weaken the capacity of the Serbs to wage war in Kosovo by reducing their 
war potentials… 
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Also, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair spoke of the risk of weakening NATO, but 
he also pointed out that this was not the most important reason for intervention: “To walk 
away now would not merely destroy the NATO’s credibility; more importantly would be 
a breach of faith with thousands of innocent civilians.”
132
 
Among the variety of reasons stated in speeches by several politicians 
133
, it is certain that 
the use of force was invoked to address the humanitarian catastrophe and that was made 
clear in the Security Council's Resolutions which not only determined the threat to peace 
and security, but also stated that the resort to force to address the problem was a real 
possibility, by mentioning the additional measures in case of non-compliance in 
Resolution 1160 (1998) and reconfirming this view in Resolution 1199 that: "should the 
concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160(1998) not be taken, to 
consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability 
in the region". 
Solana on 23 March authorised military action as a result of the FRY's Government 
refusal to:  
Accept the interim political settlement, which has been negotiated at 
Rambouillet: 
Fully observe the limits on the Serb Army and Special Police Forces agreed on 25 
October 
End excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo.
134
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He declared that the objective of the intervention was "…to prevent more human 
suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo" 




This was reconfirmed on the same day by NATO's own Press Release.
136
 
However, the case for humanitarian intervention can create at its best a right and not an 
obligation to intervene for humanitarian purposes. Although mixed motives are a political 
reality, when geopolitics is of high relevance, they give rise to potential abuse and 
Kosovo might not be seen any more as a precedent tailored for the enforcement of the 
humanitarian norm as was hoped when intervention in Libya happened Syria is a case in 
point.  
4) What were the alternative means? 
The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated before the commencement of the 
Rambouillet talks that: 
Three outcomes are possible: If President Milosevic refuses to accept the 
Contact Group proposals, or has allowed repression in Kosovo to 
continue, he can expect NATO air strikes. 
 If the Kosovo Albanians obstruct progress at Ramboillet or on the ground, 
they cannot expect NATO and the international community to bail them 
out. Decisions on air strikes and international support will be affected, and 
we will find additional ways of bringing pressure to bear. If the two sides 








do reach agreement, we will need to concentrate our effort on making sure 
that it is successfully implemented.
137
 
In the end, the Rambouillet negotiations failed and no agreement was reached. 
The Kosovo delegation was finally persuaded to sign, but that did not happen with the 
Serb representatives. However, at a Council meeting on the 24 March the Russian 
Representative stated very clearly that: 
NATO's decision to use military force is particularly unacceptable from 
any point of view because the potential of political and diplomatic 
methods to yield a settlement has certainly not been exhausted'.
138
 
Outraged by NATO's military intervention, the Chinese representative 
heading the Security Council at the time said: Recently, the parties 




Hence the different political climate: Rambouillet was initiated when violent massacres 
had resumed and both parties were prepared for a escalation in fighting and intention to 
compromise was in neither agenda, whereas Dayton found the parties exhausted after 
three years of fighting. The partition of Bosnia also represented a realistic compromise, 
whereas Milosevic‘s share in Kosovo was much greater. Furthermore, there was no threat 
of sanctions on the country’s economy as there was when the Council imposed economic 
sanctions on the FRY in Resolution 757 (1992).
140
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 Michael P. Scharf and Joshua L. Dorosin, "Interpreting UN Sanctions: The Rulings and Role of the 




Therefore, even with the absence of the necessary political dynamics, Rambouillet 
attempted a solution by peaceful means. But at the same time it had also exhausted all the 
diplomatic options to address the conflict. Further it added to the certainty that resort to 
force would be the effective answer to the problem. 
 Just before the military action commenced, on 23 March NATO's Secretary General 
Solana concluded that:  
" All Efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, 
no alternative is open but to take military Actions."
141
 
Rambouillet offered no effective diplomatic solution
142
, given the intractability of 
various issues. It is also true that the Security Council was asserting its responsibility in 
the crisis
143
, but this continuing assertion also confirmed its failure effectively to resolve 
the crisis. In the words of UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan himself:  "It is indeed 
tragic that the diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be 
legitimate in the pursuit of peace."
144
  
Authorization of the use of force was an alternative within the remaining alternative of 
using force. Bypassing the Council was the other option and the one which NATO chose. 
 The Security Council could have indeed been asked for authorisation on the use of force 
as the threat to international peace and security was already established. However, there 
were persistent objections by the Russian side and China, both Members of the P5 and 
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whose veto is decisive in the Council granting such authority.  So, one hypothesis that 
such authorization by the Council would have been probably refused, to stop the agony of 
the Kosovo people, based on moral grounds, NATO decided to follow its own decision.  
Thus, it can be asserted that there is ample evidence to prove that there 
remained no alternative means to the use of force to redress the problem. 
As a result, it can be concluded that NATO was not breaching its 
obligation under Article 7
145
 of its Statute to respect the “Security 





5) Length of time 
 When talking about humanitarian intervention, one of the criteria to be met is that the 
length of time should be determined on the basis of the immediacy of the conflict and 
consequently be proportionate to the solution of the former. However, there is clearly no 
time limit to justify intervention.  Every case is assessed on its merits and duration may 
differ on a number of factors such as political constraints and costs, geographical 
position, and military resistance.  A NATO Air Commander expressed the intention of a 
short campaign by stating that: " I had been told, I can't tell you how many times: you're 
only going to be allowed to bomb two maybe three nights- that 's all Washington can 
stand, some members of the Alliance stated…this'll be over in three nights."
147
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Whereas the British Prime Minister made himself clear that the bombing would continue 




 The Legitimacy of NATO’s Intervention  
The Security Council never passed the draft resolution proposed by Russia condemning 
the intervention when it had already started
149
. Sometimes, that has been seen as an 
implicit authorization making the operation “legal.” However such an interpretation is far 
from reaching.  "The Charter requires a positive decision by the Council, not the absence 
of a negative one-otherwise the veto power of the permanent members would be 
pointless."
150
 Hence, the refusal of the condemning draft resolution indicates general 
acceptance as to the legitimacy of the intervention.  Still, there was little consistency 
amongst politicians on whether there were ample legal grounds for NATO’s action. The 
classifying language contains the term of ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ instead of   
‘humanitarian intervention.’ Robin Cook, then the British Foreign Secretary stated that: 
“The legal basis for our action is that the international community [sic] states do have the 
right to use force in the case of overwhelming humanitarian necessity”
151
.  In fact there 
was no such clear-cut picture of international law. Although the moral aspect of the 
intervention in Kosovo is randomly seen as a justification for the action, for the countries 
that carried out the operation, it formed the basis of an obligation, the impact of which 
gave rise to the only means left of bringing the crisis to an end. The importance of such a 
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moral obligation was expressed by the German President of the European Union at the 
time, when stating:  
on the threshold of the 21
st
 century, Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian 
catastrophe in its midst’. It cannot be permitted that, in the middle of 
Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of 
its rights and subjected to grave human right abuses. We, the countries of 
the European Union, are under a moral obligation to ensure that 
indiscriminate behaviour and violence, which became tangible in the 
massacre of Racak in January 1999, are not repeated. We have a duty to 
organization was also bound by its Statute, Article 1 which states: “As set 
out by the United Nations Charter, the contracting parties undertake to 
settle by peaceful means any international dispute they might get involved 
in, so that no threat would be posed to international peace, security and 
justice and to refrain in their international relations from threatening to use 
or using force in any way that would not be in keeping with the purposes 
of the United Nations.”
152
 However, one could argue that using the term 
‘purposes’ rather than asking more specifically for compliance with the 
‘provisions’ of the ensure the return to their homes of the hundreds of 




The Canadian representative declared that supporting the Draft Resolution to Condemn 
NATO’s Action would position States “outside the international consensus, which means 
that the time has come to stop the continuing violence against the Kosovo population.”
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Having said that, NATO as a regional Charter leaves more scope for 
interpretation to accommodate the variety of circumstances not covered expressly 
by the Charter.
155
  Even the Danish Institute for Foreign Affairs concluded that 
“In extreme cases, humanitarian intervention may be necessary and justified on 
moral and political grounds even if an authorization from the United Nations 
Security Council cannot be obtained.”
156
 
And after all, NATO in Kosovo was not a battle for territory, but one for humanity. It was 





NATO's operation in Kosovo was a necessity and clearly addressed a large-scale 
humanitarian catastrophe. It put a stop to ethnic cleansing and the abuse of Kosovo 
Albanians, although it was limited to the deployment of air power.  More importantly, it 
provided the Province, with a high degree of autonomy.   However, the legality of the 
intervention is less clear. In the context of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in 
international law, it can be said that there is ample state practice to indicate the existence 
of humanitarian intervention, but the strength of the opinio juris was not fully 
established.  The Kosovo case might have changed something in this direction by 
introducing a case unique in the complexity of its nature: There were no doubts as to the 
ripening of the humanitarian disaster and the Security Council had acknowledged that It 
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had explicitly condemned the FRY’s actions on the Kosovo-Albanian population; it had 
called for an end to violence and repression. It had expressed the need for additional 
measures in case of non-compliance and then it had stopped giving any realistic input 
into the solution of the problem. 
It is true that NATO acted without UN authorization, but force was its last resort.  
Some of the principal countries in the operation had previously lead lengthy negotiations 
for a peaceful settlement through the Rambouillet Accords, by amending agreements and 
extending deadlines in the hope of achieving a compromise. Unfortunately, the talks 
failed and only removed any doubts about the effective redress being anything else but 
military intervention. 
  Kosovo represents a pivotal step in international law. It is the best case that can 
currently be made for humanitarian intervention; it helped the norm of Responsibility to 
Protect to emerge in international law which however requires further consolidation. The 
Kosovo case proves the will of world leaders to intervene based on moral grounds and 
apparently opened the road to intervention in Libya, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
As stated in my hypothesis, the Kosovo case demonstrates that  leaders at times place the 
moral imperative for humanitarian intervention above national interest but as we will see 






NATO Involvement in Libya and Responsibility to Protect 
Chapter six 
A short history of Libya 
The name “Libya” was adopted in 1934, by Italy (used by the Greeks for all of North 
Africa, except Egypt) as the official name of the colony, which consisted of the 
Provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan.
158
 This thesis will focus on the history 
from 1951 and Libya’s independence up to Qadhafi.  
 
Libya was the first country to achieve independence through the United Nations on 24 
December 1951. As a fact, on November 21, 1949, the UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution stating that Libya should become independent before January 1, 1952. During 
these negotiations with the UN, Libya was represented by King Idris I, and Lybia was 
proclaimed a constitutional and a hereditary monarchy under King Idris. In 1959, the 
discovery of significant oil reserves led the country to be extremely wealthy, although the 
wealth was concentrated in the hands of the elite.  
On 1 September 1969, Mu’ammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi staged a coup d’etat against 
King Idris; at the time he was a 28 year-old army officer.
159
 Hence, he named himself 
chief of state and proclaimed the new Libyan Arab Republic.  
In the 1970s, Libya claimed the leadership of Arab and African revolutionary forces and 
sought an active role in international organizations.  
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The 1980s Libya’s growing friendship with the U.S.S.R., led to increased tensions with 
the West. The tension increased even more in 1986, following a bombing attack against 
American military personnel in Berlin. In response, the U.S imposed unilateral economic 
sanctions. 
In 1988, Libya was implicated in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie.  As 
a result, Scotland and the UN imposed additional sanctions.   
In 1999, Libya fulfilled one of the UNSCR requirements by surrendering two Libyans 
suspected in connection with the bombing for trial before a Scottish court in the 
Netherlands.  In August 2003, Libya fulfilled the remaining UNSCR requirements and as 
a result, UN sanctions were lifted on 12 September 2003. After 2003, Qadhafi tried 
to make significant improvements in normalizing relations with Western 
nations. 
The Arab revolution that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in 
late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. Qadhafi's brutal repression on protesters 
broke into civil war that triggered UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the 
international community.
160
 After months of back and forth fighting between government 
and opposition forces, the Qadhafi regime fell in the middle of 2011 and was replaced by 













Arab Spring  
The Arab Spring captivated the Arab World. Protests started in Tunisia whose leader was 
Ben Ali, and in Egypt headed by Hosni Mubarak. The revolution spread very quickly 
from Morocco to Bahrain.
162
 It seemed like all the authoritarian states of the Arabian 
Peninsula would finally be freed. Outraged protestors and a thirst of freedom had 
produced this new wave, and continued to send it forward. 
In Libya, social forces opposed to Muammar Qadhafi had begun to rebel, but they were 
weak. 
163
   Qaddafi’s forces responded to the initial peaceful protests against the excesses 
of his regime, and killed perhaps more than a thousand of his own people. Hence, they 
were supported by France and the United States, with promises of freedom. 
 
NATO began its assault, ushering in a Libyan Winter
164
 that cast its shadow over 
the Arab Spring. Libya erupted in the middle of two revolutions Tunisia and Egypt and as 
a consequence the fever for democracy was inevitable.  The social will of the Libyan 
people to stand up against tyranny and dictatorship stems from the fact that they had been 
deprived of basic human rights. The people had reclined constant insults from the 
 notorious leader, who was narcissistic and showed no respect for his own people. 
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The uprising in Libya started on 15 February 2011 in the east-Libyan town of Benghazi 
after Libyan authorities arrested a human rights activist. It escalated radically by Libyan 
loyalists on 18 February. During February, a growing number of Libyan forces, 
diplomats and politicians defected to the opposition while several towns fell into the 
hands of the rebels. Violent protests and clashes started also in Tripoli.
166
 This 
development compelled Qadhafi to launch a military counteroffensive with all means of 
force.  As a result, the Qadhafi forces were able to retake several cities, forcing the rebels 
to withdraw.  That led to the first UN Security Council Resolution 1970 of February 26, 
which specifically invoked “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its 
population,” condemned its violence against civilians, demanded that this stop. The UN 
sought to concentrate Qadhafi’s mind by applying targeted sanctions, an arms embargo 
and the threat of International Criminal Court prosecution for crimes against humanity.
167
 
In contrast, as it became apparent Qadhafi was not only ignoring the UN resolution but 
indeed planning a major assault on Benghazi in which no mercy whatever would be 
shown to perceived opponents, armed or otherwise, whom he called “cockroaches.”
168
 
In response, the Security Council followed up with Resolution 1973 of 17 March, which 
included the R2P principle. 
 
The International’s Community Reactions 
In 2011, Western politicians such as US President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister 
David Cameron and other members of the NATO alliance praised what they believed was 




 Gareth Evans, Interview: The R2P Balance Sheet After Libya, September, 2011, avaliable at: 
http://www.globalr2p.org/publications/205, seen on 20 April, 2014 
168
 Evans, Ibid 
81 
 
a successful campaign to intervene in Libya. As seen above, the UN Security Council, on 
26 February 2011, unanimously adopted resolution 1970, which was not taken seriously 
by Qadhafi. 
169
 The Security Council demanded an end to the violence, and imposed a 
series of international sanctions. The Council also decided to refer the situation to the 
International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the Security Council, adopted resolution 
1973, on 17 March 2011, and demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an 




The Council authorized Member States to take "all necessary measures" to protect 
civilians under threat of attack in the country, and only a few days later, acting on the 
resolution, NATO planes began striking Qadhafi’s forces.
171
 
Many other international organizations like the European Union (EU),
172
 the African 
Union (AU)
173
, the League of Arab States (LAS)
174
, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC)
175
, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
176
   together criticized the 
actions of the Qadhafi regime. Hence, requested for a no-fly zone, and urged the Qadhafi 
regime to stop the violence. Between all the states, only Turkey and Russia rejected the 
idea of a no-fly zone in Libya. While Germany and the U.S. opposed a military 
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On 10 March, NATO ministers in accordance with the United Nations
178
  gathered in 
Paris to decide on the policy and measures to be taken toward Libya. The NATO 
members decided to consider that "...in order to protect the civilian population, Member 
States will examine all necessary options provided, to prove that there is a demonstrable 
need of humanitarian intervention, a clear legal basis and support from the region."
179
 It 
was decided as well that Qadhafi had to resign.  In contrast to the NATO decision, the 
most important leader in Europe, German chancellor Angela Merkel "expressed her 
skepticism" of military action. On the other side the French President Nicholas Sarkozy 
stated that France and Britain were in favor of intervening in Libya.
180
 
During the meeting of the G8 in Paris, the European leaders continued to take different 
decisions regarding Libya. As mentioned,  Germany signaled no willingness to 
participate in a military intervention. The U.S. insisted on obtaining a UN Security 
Council resolution to allow the use of military force, in order to pave the way for further 
action. 
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In the meanwhile, Qadhafi’s infamous speech over the radio where he declared his 
intention  to "have no mercy" with the rebels
181
 pushed the UNSC only hours later to 
adopt resolution 1973, on 17 March 2011 which created the legal authority for an 
intervention. 
Demanding an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the 
current attacks against civilians, which it said it might constitute “crimes 
against humanity” Security Council this evening imposed a ban on all 
flights in the country’s airspace a no-fly zone-and tightened sanctions on 




The UNSC resolution passed with ten votes in favor none against, with five abstentions:  
Germany, Brazil, Russia, China, and India. In the rebel territory within Libya, the UNSC 
resolution led to cheers and approval. Furthermore, the Council authorized States, “to 
take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, 
including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part 





NATO’s Intervention in Libya 
NATO action commenced immediately to stop a major catastrophe in Benghazi. Even 
though, by some skeptics this was an exaggerated excuse, Evans states that  “it was  
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inconceivable that Arab League support for the Security Council would have been 




The first strikes against Libya began on 19 March, conducted by France and Great 
Britain. Then, on 01 April 2011, NATO took over the full implementation of resolution 
1973 with the  aim to  protect civilians. The mission was called “Unified Protector.”  
There were different reactions from some states regarding this mission; Germany decided 
to withdraw  troops from Naples, which was the main base of the mission, Turkey tried to 
negotiate a new cease-fire, while Russia, China, Brazil and India criticized the whole 
mission. On behalf of Russia, the foreign minister Sergei Lavrov accused NATO of 
exceeding the goal of the resolution and recommended: "if somebody would like to get 
authorization to use force to achieve a shared goal by all of us, they would have to 
specify in the resolution who this somebody is, who is going to use this authorization, 
what the rules of engagement are and the limits on the use of force.”
185
 NATO officially 
ended its mission on 31 October 2011. Despite some criticism, the mission was 
successful. Without the massive support of the coalition forces engaged in operation 
“Unified Protector,” the success of the Libyan revolt would have been impossible. 
Although there has been a wide spread perception that NATO stretched its mandate to the 
absolute limit, in Libya. According to Evans: 
it would have been much more comfortable if NATO had confined its 
role, after neutralizing the Libyan air force and halting the ground forces 
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moving on Benghazi, confined itself essentially to a watching-brief role: 
maintaining the no-fly zone and being prepared to attack whenever 
civilians or civilian areas were being putting at risk.  
 
Despite some criticism, NATO’s intervention was crucial in regard to human rights and 
in securing the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime by the rebel forces. NATO observed 
some constraints in its engagement, including the obvious one of not putting fighting 
troops on the ground, which according to Evans, prolonged the struggle more. However, 
to conclude there’s little doubt that NATO’s intervention in Libya was decisive. It 
secured regime change, by removing the Qadhafi regime from power which was the only 
way to protect civilians from atrocities by the regime. 
 
What scholars say about R2P and Libya? 
As seen in chapter three, the R2P norm is widely accepted by most heads of State. The 
UN has pronounced that states have the responsibility to protect their citizens, and that 
the international community has the responsibility to intervene on some level when states 
fail to do so. And yet, the methods and degree of this response remains controversial. 
 
The controversy began when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 in 
response to the escalating civil war in Libya. As seen above, citing Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, the Security Council authorized member states “to take all 
necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
86 
 
attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” 
186
   Gareth Evans says that: “maybe, just maybe, 
we’ll be able to say ‘never again’ in the future without having to periodically look back, 
as has so often been the case in the past, asking ourselves, with a mixture of anger, 




 Regarding the R2P concept, Weiss notes that although R2P is often described as an 
“emerging norm, it has already played a decisive role in shaping international debates 
about human rights violations and humanitarian response.” He recommends that: R2P 
must not be defined too broadly, as “broadening perspectives has opened the floodgates 
to an overflow of appeals to address too many problems.” And “it must not be defined 




However, Ramesh Thakur critiques the military intervention in Libya. According to him 
it was not a good example of R2P in action. He’s of idea that “the United Nations was 
neither designed nor expected to be a pacifist organization.” According to Thakur R2P is 
a useful norm in shaping military humanitarian intervention, and on the importance of 
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military intervention as a part of R2P, he argues that “to be meaningful, the R2P 




Following Thakur’s point of view, O’Connell asserts that: “in Libya, military force was 
not used as an option of last resort,” and she underlies that sanctions, negotiations, and 
other peaceful measures were not properly attempted beforehand. According to 
O’Connell, international law demands that military interveners must show that their 
actions are only as last resort, and they will do more good than harm.  Hence, she 





 Criticizing the intervention in Libya, Hehir, argues that R2P has been applied 
inconsistently according to the interests of the 5 permanent members of the Security 
Council.  He states that United Nations, “substantial legal, political and institutional 
reform”
191
  is needed to ensure the prevention of future mass atrocities which remains a 
“structural barrier to effective action.”  
Furthermore, Alex Bellamy offers another criticism regarding R2P and the military 
intervention in Libya. He suggests distinguishing the concept of R2P from regime 
change. According to Bellamy, many countries, like China, Brazil and South Africa have 
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criticized R2P for being a tool of Western powers to affect regime change. Thus, to his 
point of view R2P should be applied in the future as a norm in accordance with all the 
countries. He recommends that the international community must be prudent in 
maintaining the distinction between R2P and regime change. 
192
 
According to David Chandler, Libya doesn’t represent a case of humanitarian 
intervention at all, and the West has only used R2P as an excuse for intervention.
193
 
When the norm of humanitarian intervention was emerging during the nineties, the 
global leaders were the UN, NATO, and the EU, who sensed the immediate need for 
change regarding humanitarian intervention. The author expressed, yet after 
unauthorized intervention in Kosovo, the failed wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
emerged R2P norm remains “a complex, unstable norm, where interventions are ad hoc 
and do not involve Western responsibility or transformative promise.” The military 
intervention in Libya has not much to do with the real intention of R2P and 
humanitarian intervention. 
Rodger Shanahan, expressed concern over the inconsistency of the application of the 
R2P norm, by stating that; “the selectivity of the concept’s application has already 
opened it up to criticism from those parts of the international community who see in 
R2P another justification for western interference in the developing world’s internal 
political affairs”
194
  however “the next few years will see whether R2P is likely to 
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Rachel Gerber puts the focus on the “prevention pillar”; which is mostly neglected in 
international policy discussions according to her, but is instead even more important than 
intervention: “why wait to halt a massacre if early engagement might avert it entirely?”
196
 
Gerber recommends that R2P must develop the prevention pillar, stating that, 
We must develop a framework for prevention that at once targets these 
unique dynamics across the various phases of potential crisis and 
prioritizes atrocity-focused objectives within broader efforts to prevent 
conflict, promote security, and encourage economic development. 
 Abiodun Williams suggests separating R2P from military intervention. To his point of 
view, branching out from a focus of military intervention, R2P could: 
Enhance local and international institutional capacities to assess and 
address the risk of atrocities at an earlier stage through primary 
prevention, ensure robust measures are taken to halt R2P crimes in a more 
consistent manner, and rebuild societies emerging from conflict.
197
 
As seen above there are different points of view, ideas and recommendations between 
scholars of international relations about R2P. However, to make an evaluation of its 
application, one should judge case by case. Despite the critics, the Responsibility to 
Protect is a norm whose time has come to be applied properly. For centuries, human 
catastrophes have gone un-prevented.  As Evans asks: 
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Why did it take so long after World War II for the international 
community to agree that they had the responsibility to protect civilians 
from genocide and mass atrocities? It seems like the world said “never 




 The emergence of the new responsibility to protect norm may not in itself guarantee 
that the world has seen the end of mass atrocity crimes once and for all, but at least we 
do have a norm now which has made a fundamental shift in attitudes on the scope and 
limits of state sovereignty. Since its foundation, the UN has had to address the problem 
of states waging war against each other, 
199
and not only human rights. What mostly 
defines the controversy is Article 2(7) of the UN Charter: “Nothing should authorize 
intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.” 
 
On the other hand, even non-intervention is criticized. Before R2P, even when the 
international community did react through the UN, as Evans explains, “ it was too often 
erratically, incompletely or counter-productively, as in the debacle of Somalia in 1993, 
the catastrophe of Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the almost unbelievable default in 
Srebrenica in Bosnia just a year later, in 1995.”  
 
When it came to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, most governments accepted quite 
rapidly that external military intervention was the only way to stop it. But again the 
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Security Council failed to act, this time in the face of a threatened veto by Russia.
200
 
According to Evans, Libya was a spectacular step forward. The Security Council passes 
resolution 1973 – the first of its kind specifically invoking the responsibility to protect in 
a particular country situation – approving “all necessary measures” (which in UN-speak 
means military force) to secure civilian protection objectives in the context of atrocity 
crimes being committed and feared.
201
 Nevertheless there have been negative reactions to 
the way in which NATO interpreted its mandate in Libya. “The Libyan case was, at least 
at the outset, a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to, 
with nothing else in issue but stopping continuing and imminent mass atrocity crimes.” 
He concludes by saying that the Responsibility to Protect norm may not in itself 
guarantee that the world has seen the end of mass atrocity crimes once and for all, but it 





The application of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect will inevitably remain 
selective and highly contingent on the political context. The humanitarian imperative is a 
strong and growing global impulse, and humanitarian intervention is still subject to the 
constraints of geopolitics, resources, and political will.  As Thakur writes, the operation 
in Libya marks a pivotal rebalancing of interest and values. 
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What has been most striking in the Libyan case is the consolidation of R2P as a vital 
global norm. The implementation of R2P as we saw in this chapter depends on the 
attitudes of the Security Council, and especially on the national interests of the P-5. Libya 
marks the first time that the Security Council has authorized an international operation. 
While in the Balkans, it took a full decade to intervene with air power, with the adoption 
of Responsibility to Protect in Libya it took only a month as mentioned in chapter three, 
to mobilize a broad coalition, secure a United Nations mandate, establish and enforce a 
no-fly zone and no- drive zones, stop Qadhafi’s advancing army and prevent a massacre 
of the innocents civilians in Benghazi.  Libya has demonstrated the viability of a well-
implemented R2P intervention. Yet just because the doctrine was successful in Libya, 
one should not assume that the UN and its allies will apply it universally. As atrocities 
emerge in Syria, the international community will need to have the agreement of the P-5, 
Arab League, NATO and all factors to find a final solution. 
The political willingness remains selective on humanitarian intervention. Intervention 
must balance the goal of preventing suffering with other interests and commitments. 
Some conflicts, such as Syria, are dauntingly complex and would impose unacceptable 









Syria: the Unresolved Case 
Chapter seven 
A short history of Syria 
Syria declared its independence on April 17, 1946.
203
Syrian politics from independence 
through the late 1960s were marked by constant upheaval.  Syria's political instability 
during the years after the 1954 coup, the parallelism of Syrian and Egyptian policies, and 
the appeal of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership in the wake of the 
1956 Suez crisis created support in Syria for union with Egypt. On February 1, 1958, the 
two countries merged to create the United Arab Republic, and all Syrian political parties 




The union was not a success, however. Following a military coup on September 28, 
1961, Syria seceded, reestablishing itself as the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the 
Government explored the possibility of creating a federation with Egypt and Ba'ath--
controlled Iraq. An agreement was concluded in Cairo on April 17, 1963, for a 
referendum on unity to be held in September 1963.  
 
However, serious disagreements among the parties soon developed, and the tripartite 
federation failed to materialize. On February 23, 1966, a group of army officers carried 
out a successful, intra-party coup, imprisoned President Hafiz, dissolved the cabinet and 
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abrogated the provisional constitution, and designated a regionalist, civilian Ba'ath 
government.
205
 The defeat of the Syrians and Egyptians in the June 1967 war with Israel 
weakened the radical socialist regime established by the 1966 coup. The 1970 retreat of 
Syrian forces sent to aid the PLO during the "Black September" hostilities with Jordan 
reflected this political disagreement within the ruling Ba'ath leadership. On November 
13, 1970, Minister of Defense Hafiz al-Assad affected a bloodless military coup, ousting 
the civilian party leadership and assuming the role of prime minister. 206 
In March 1973, a new Syrian constitution went into effect followed shortly thereafter by 
parliamentary elections for the People's Council, the first such elections since 1962.  
From 1976 until its suppression in 1982, the arch conservative Muslim Brotherhood led 
an armed insurgency against the regime. In response to an attempted uprising by the 
brotherhood in February 1982, the government crushed the fundamentalist opposition 
centered in the city of Hama.  
 
Syria's 1991 participation in the U.S.-led multinational coalition aligned against Saddam 
Hussein marked a dramatic watershed in Syria's relations both with other Arab states and 
with the West. Syria participated in the multilateral Middle East Peace Conference in 
Madrid in October 1991, and during the 1990s engaged in direct, face-to-face 
negotiations with Israel.  
Hafiz Al-Assad died on June 10, 2000, after 30 years in power. Immediately following 
Al-Assad’s death, the parliament amended the constitution, reducing the mandatory 
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minimum age of the President from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar 
Al-Assad legally to be eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'ath party. On July 10, 
2000, Bashar Al-Assad was elected President by referendum in which he ran unopposed, 
garnering 97.29% of the vote, according to Syrian government statistics. 
Politics of Assad 
 After Bashar al-Assad took over, everybody thought that the Western-educated ruler 
would sustainably reform the country. Indeed, he followed the idea to "modernize or 
upgrade authoritarianism," that is to improve the system without real changes or a more 
democratic approach towards domestic Syrian policy.
207
 His family has an Alawite 
background, which is a part of Shiism, a minority religious group in Syria, in contrast to 
Sunni that makes up the majority.
208
 Hence, the conflict between the ruling alawites and 
the Sunni rebel majority also represents a history of tensions and conflicts between these 
ethnic groups. Syria was a member of the Arab League, the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the United 
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The main focus of Syria’s foreign and economic policy is toward the East. Syria had ties 
with Iraq since 2000, which brought it into alliance with the U.S. in 2003; when Assad 
only politically opposed the intervention. 
209
 
The dispute with Lebanon, where Syria has a particular interest, forced Assad to 
intohaving a relationship with Iran, to provide support and to influence on the Hezbollah 
in Lebanon in a way to counterbalance Israel and the U.S. Syrian troops –stationed in 




However, its best ally remains Russia, with whom Syria maintains close connections. 
Russia even has a navy base in the Syrian city of Tartus that was founded in 1971. 
Russia is expanding more of its forces to the Tartus naval base, which constitutes the 
only Russian base in the Mediterranean. As we will see later, this might explain the veto 
of Russia on SC resolution regarding the intervention in Syria. 
 Assad's attempted to modernize the Syrian economy by using the concept of a 'social 
market' economy.
211
This attempt failed and Syria's political support for Iraq since 2002/ 
2003 had a significant economic cost caused by U.S. embargos. 
In May2007, a referendum by popular vote approved Bashar al-Assad’s second term as 
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president. As seen in a previous chapter, like in Libya, Syria was influenced by the Arab 
Spring that began in the region, and antigovernment protests broke out in the southern 
province of Dar’a in March 2010.
212
 Protesters were crying out for revoking the 
restrictive Emergency Law which allowed arrests without charge, the legalization of 
political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials.
213
 
 The government responded to this tension by repealing of Emergency Law and 
approving laws which permitted new political parties, and liberalized local and national 
elections. The government reacted because demonstrations had spread to nearly every 
city in Syria. However, this didn’t mean that the government, especially Assad, had any 
intention stepping down. Indeed, the government’s response to armed opposition activity 
from the start, has led to extended violent clashes. 
Although verbal international pressure on the Assad regime has intensified since 2011, 
carried out by Arab League, the EU, Turkey, and the United States which also expanded 
economic sanctions against the regime, nothing much has changed.
214
 
 U.N.-Arab League special envoy Kofi Annan promoted a six-point initiative plan to end 
the violence, bring in relief, and forge a political process to address grievances in Syria. 
Annan has stressed that "implementation of the plan is the key" and the Assad regime 
needs "to put its commitments into immediate effect." Even though at the beginning the 









plan was accepted and the Assad regime has said it is committed to end the violence, he 
continued the crackdown just the same.
215
 The plan was never fully adhered to by either 
side and as violence continued to escalate, Annan decided to resign by stating:“the 
increasing militarization of the Syrian conflict and the clear lack of the unity in the 
Security Council had fundamentally changed the circumstances for the effective exercise 
on my role.”
216
 According to Mr. Annan the problems were “compounded by the 
disunity of the international community,” especially by Russia and China who have 
vetoed resolution on the crisis three times. He expressed that it was impossible for him or 
anyone to compel the Syrian government and the opposition, to bring about a political 
solution.
217
 He continued that Syria can still be saved if the international community can 
show the courage of leadership, for the sake of Syrian people. He said “he did not rule 




In October 2012, Lakhdar Brahimi, the current Joint Special Representative of the 
United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, began meeting with 
regional heads of state to assist in brokering a cease-fire.
219
 
While the opposition had lacked cohesion early on in the conflict, in December 2012, 
more than 130 countries recognized the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and 
                                                          
215
 Syria crisis, Kofi Annan quits as a UN-Arab League  envoy, 02 August 2012, news conference at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19099676, seen on 05 May 2014 
216




 Annan, Ibid 
219
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html, Syria’s Background, seen 
on 5 May 2014 
99 
 
Opposition Forces, as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
220
 
 In 2013, the unrest persisted and the death toll among Syrian Government forces, 
opposition forces, and civilians had topped 100,000.
221
 In January 2014, the Syrian 
Opposition Coalition and Syrian regime began peace talks at the UN sponsored Geneva 
II conference. However by April 2014 the number of the deaths exceeded 150,000 with 
the regime dropping barrel bombs on civilian targets.
222
 
By May 2014, the media reported that Brahimi who had replaced Annan was going to 
resign on 13 May 2014. Brahimi was expected to brief the Security Council on 13 May, 
and according to the Guardian, this is almost certain to be his final appearance. As the 
Guardian writes, the veteran Algerian mediator replaced Mr. Annan in 2012.
223
During 
his two rounds of peace talks in Geneva, between Assad and opposition representatives 
no agreement was really reached except for one week ceasefire. 
224
 When Brahimi 
resigns, the new mediator is expected to report only to the UN. The other preceding 
mediators, Annan and Brahimi, represented both the UN and Arab League. However due 
to the deep division within the Arab world over Syria this has changed. As Black writes; 
“Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf states openly back the anti-Assad rebels, while 
countries such as Algeria and Iraq stand solidly behind Damascus. The Arab League’s 
role has become a drag because of the division”. 
225
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On April 30, 2014 a Syrian government fighter jet fired a missile at a school in the 
northern city of Aleppo that killed as many as 47 people, mainly children, as students 




A Syrian government statement on Wednesday said the military had carried out 
operations against terrorists in Aleppo, but it didn't address the strike on the school. The 
strike came days after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad announced that he would run for 
a third, seven-year term in the country's June elections. 
Despite military gains by the Syrian government across the country, violent clashes 
continue to plague the country, a challenge for election plans. The Syrian opposition and 
its Western and Arab backers, including the U.S., have denounced the election plan, 
which they say can't be free or fair amid a civil war.
227
  
Sadly enough, “the missile strike occurred at 9 a.m. when a Russian-made MiG jet fired 
at the Ein Jalout school. A frantic search for any students and teachers alive and trapped 
in the rubble continued until 5 pm.”
228
 
Images of the school posted on social media, which couldn't be verified, showed a mess 
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of shattered desks, pools of blood and drawings scribbled with colored pencils, depicting 




Despite many incidents of mass murder, now the greatest concern now of UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon is that thousands of people are not getting the medical aid 
including life-saving medicines, that they need, as was reported in Reuters. 
Medical supplies, including life-saving medicines and vaccines, and equipment for the 
wounded and the sick are commodities privileged throughout the Geneva Conventions. 
Denying these is arbitrary and unjustified, and a clear violation of international 
humanitarian law, Ban said.  
"Yet, medicines are routinely denied to those who need them, including tens of 
thousands of women, children, and elderly."
230
 Furthermore, he stated that nearly 3.5 
million people were largely without access to essential goods and services due to this 
civil war, which is now in its fourth year. The Security Council was due to discuss the 
report later in May 2014.
231
 











Syrian allies, Russia and China, have shielded Syria on Security Council resolution three 
times during the war. “They had previously vetoed three resolutions that would have 
condemned Syria's government and threatened it with possible sanctions.”
232
 
 Furthermore, cross-border humanitarian aid remains a problem, even though the UN has 
asked for more cross-border access especially from Jordan and Turkey. The Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon added that this request still remains pending because the “Syrian 





NATO, No Intervention in Syria 
The Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that the alliance has no intention 
of intervening in Syria. The denial for a NATO mission in Syria is broader, and based on 
a very specific argument. Secretary General also doubts the possibility of a NATO 
intervention, even with a UN mandate, and instead urges the Arab states to find a 
regional solution.  
Second, Syria is also a different society; which is much more complicated ethnically, 
politically and religiously, as seen above in previous paragraphs.  For these reasons, 







Rasmussen stated on 17 February 2012, “I do believe that a regional solution should be 
found,” referring to the Arab League.
234
 
Third, the current political disapproval by Russia, China and others of the intervention in 
Libya, and fourth, an intervention in Syria would constitute high military risks for 
NATO. The military intervention against the weaker Libyan forces reveals several 
military flaws within NATO which at the time had a major ally; the U.S.
235
 This issue 
influences the whole NATO decision-making process on the Syrian case. To make it 
short, NATO will not intervene without the support of the U.S, but even if U.S decides to 
support NATO, the advanced Syrian forces backed by Russia may cause some major 
problems for the West. Thus, the NATO Secretary General only presented the position of 
the North Atlantic Council, where NATO member states are not eager to start a new 
military mission. Even though, there is clear evidence of the use of chemical weapons. 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen said “it was up to individual NATO countries to decide how 
they would respond to the attack and he did not envisage any NATO role beyond 
existing plans to defend NATO member Turkey, which borders Syria.”
236
 
In a live interview for CNN - London, in April 2014 Rasmussen said that, NATO would 
not be taking part in any military action; Despite his declaration, he stated that chemical 
weapons should not go un-answered. He stated that NATO has sent a strong message to 
Turkey that NATO will defend its borders. “However, if individual alleys want to 
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respond militarily and individually I would recommend a short, tailored measured 
military operation, and for that you don’t need a NATO command system.
237
 Again he 
stressed: “we are focused only in the protection of Turkey; of course a possible attack 
versus this country will have NATO’s response.”He condemned the use of chemical 
weapons, and call for the international community to react and prevent such chemical 
attacks from happening again. On the question of a possible limited, narrow strike 
declared by U.S President Obama he enthusiastically answered:   
I do believe that a narrow short limited tailored action would be an appropriate response 
to the horrendous use of chemical weapons, I also would like to stress that there is no 
long-term military solution conflict in Syria. Speaking about long-term perspective we 
need a political process leading to a political settlement.
238
 
To the question: Why did NATO provide support for Libya and isn’t prepared to provide 
any further support for a Syrian intervention?  
He answered: “In Libya we had a clear United Nations mandate, we had clear support 
from countries in the region, and there is no call for NATO action in Syria.”
239
 
To sum-up, regarding Syria, NATO wisely recognizes the military and political risk of a 
possible intervention, hence prefers to not interfere.   
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R2P in Syria 
When it comes to robust action in Syria, where bloodshed and suffering are far worse 
than Libya, The Security Council remains paralyzed. According to Weiss, “It is not the 
R2P norm, but rather geopolitics and collective spinelessness that explain action in Libya 
and inaction in Syria”.
240
What Hehir calls the “permanence of inconsistency” is an 
accurate description of the politics of R2P, or indeed the politics of anything.
241
 As 
Weiss argues; The responsibility to protect is a principle and not a tactic. It is simply a 
humanitarian principle.
242
World leaders contributed in reframing sovereignty as 
contingent rather than absolute, but when it comes to Syria sovereignty and-interference 
remain intact. According to Weiss, the UN General Assembly initially condemned the 
violence and supported the peace plan with a two-thirds majority. On both occasions 
only 12 of 193 states in the GA voted against the resolutions. The GA resolution 
condemned Assad for mass atrocities and specifically called for his resignation. 
Furthermore, the UN’s Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P called for a 
halt to crimes against humanity. The Human Rights Council also condemned the crimes. 
The United States, the European Union, and other states imposed sanctions; the Arab 
League condemned the actions, formulated a peace plan, and sent human rights monitors. 
But still Syria didn’t stop the mass atrocities. Indeed in August 2013 it used chemical 
weapons. Even the diplomacy of high-level diplomats such as Kofi Annan and Lakhdar 
Brahimi failed. Negotiations have been ineffective in dealing with a dictator such as 
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Assad.   
Eventually, the use of chemical weapons in August 2013 indicated the signs of a game 
changer as the U.S. threatened with air strikes in spite of low support among the U.S 
Congress and Western parliaments. This seemed though to have served as a catalyst to 
push for a diplomatic solution. Russia responded by calling for a hasty agreement to 
dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons stock under the supervision of the UN. Exercising 
chemical warfare makes the survival of the population and entire ethnic groups for that 
matter, compromised into the extreme!!! 
To the question why intervention in Libya and not in Syria even though the  situation is 
far worst, Professor Weiss explains:  
The politics in the country and at the United Nations were totally different—
demonstrated by several actual or threatened double vetoes from Russian and China—as 
well as the geography and the demography; the military challenge was far tougher; and 
the potential costs by 2013 appeared to outweigh the benefits of coercion.
243
 
With support for Assad from Russia and China, the major players have been unwilling to 
take the risks that would be the outcome of any intervention. 
According to a UNHCR report, "This is the biggest humanitarian tragedy since the 
Rwandan genocide."The numbers don't lie. Too many innocent people in Syria have 
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As Weiss justly expressed, “Syria currently shames collective international conscience 




He explains that, however, that this is not the end of R2P. Syria per se demonstrates that 
a robust R2P response is never automatic. Diplomacy and Media public lamentations 
were audible, even if government security forces deployed tanks, warships, and heavy 
weapons against civilians. Unfortunately, in the case of Syria, apart from Security 
Council politics of the day, “the responsibility to protect principle” suffered a heavy 
blow due to confusion and generalizations. More foreign fighters have become involved 
and insurgent atrocities slowly but surely are replicating the crimes of the regime itself. 
Finally, it was considered much more complicated and complex than Libya and the West 
has not been willing to challenge Russia and China. 
In summary, R2P demonstrates that state sovereignty is not absolute, but contingent on 
responsible behavior.
246
Thus, responsible behavior by a government towards its citizens 
is the best shield from intervention. Expecting consistency is like fooling ourselves. 
Therefore, occasional action sometimes is preferable to no action at all, even though it is 
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case by case. Intervention depends on political will which, in turn depends on national 




The case of Syria clearly indicates that political will as exercised by world leaders 
ultimately decides whether, where and why the International community will act. 
Regardless of how violations of human rights may be, only when the political will exists, 
will leaders decide to intervene?  Only then will humanitarian factors be taken into a 
consideration and innocent people victimized by the war will get assistance and 
protection. In the case of Syria, only the moral issues are obvious, but there are too many 
factors blocking the implementation of R2P. Although Syria meets all the criteria of the 
R2P norm for a military intervention, even the diplomacy of undertaken by Annan and 
Brahimi has failed.  
Chris Joyner explains that military intervention should be the last resort and all other 
means should be exhausted first. “These means include democratic protests, appeals to 
the UN Security Council and even economic sanctions. If human rights conditions 
worsen, or the threats to the security of persons escalate in that state, the lawful 
justification –and need—for military intervention will rise correspondingly.”
247
 
The threshold of just cause to use armed force as a last resort must be taken only “when a 
massive loss of life, real or potential, with or without genocidal intent, results from either 
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deliberate government action or the inability of the government to exercise the 
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Humanitarian intervention remains a highly controversial issue as it draws from the 
concept of universality central to the human rights discourse at the same time as it 
changes dominant conceptualizations of state sovereignty.  
International Security is a high priority of nations and international organizations, such as 
United Nations to ensure mutual survival and safety. These actions include military 
intervention and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. After WWII, 
international security emerged as a new objective to prevent another world war.  
However, in the twenty-first century it took a new form, as threats are not only coming 
from states (i.e., Syria), but also from internal conflict involving ethnic groups. The 
individual, the society and the globe may become the victims of these new threats.  The 
physical and economic survival of the individual is damaged as well. Moreover, ethnic 
conflicts affect not only neighboring states but they can destabilize the credibility of 
various security organizations, including regional and international organizations. 
Usually, ethnic wars such as the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo tend to be both 
long lasting and intense. Thus in this regard, multinational and international efforts must 
be based on a strong backing from the United Nations Security Council in order to settle 
disputes.  
At the end of the Cold War, it was believed that there would be greater international 
cooperation that would turn the United Nations into a more flexible and efficient 
organization in solving international conflicts. During the 1991 Gulf War, the UN 
showed effective cooperation among its major members who allied to fight against Iraqi 
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aggression.  However, during its mission in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former 
Yugoslavia, it failed to play the role of an effective security organization as thousands of 
innocent civilians were killed during these devastating ethnic wars. After the intervention 
in Kosovo, the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, and the intervention in Libya the 
UN and NATO regained their credibility.  
The deployment of military force for human protection was largely absent from the 
international agenda until the action against Libya. Mustering the cross-cultural political 
will is never going to be easy, but Libya might be pivotal for the evolving norm of the 
responsibility to protect. Security Council resolution 1973 authorized “all measures 
necessary" against Libya to enforce a no-fly zone and to protect civilians. Prompt, robust 
and effective international action shielded Libya's people from the kind of murderous 
harm that Muammar Gaddafi inflicted on unarmed civilians in 2011. This was an 
unprecedented moment in the history of UNSC and the R2P. “The ostensibly unique 
nature of this intervention led many to predict the dawn of a more humane world, ready 
to respond to mass violence.” 
249
  
It seemed that the intervention in Libya demonstrated the efficacy of the Responsibility to 
Protect, but, as we watch the daily carnage in Syria and the number of refugees leaving 
their country, R2P seems to have failed.  
 
Although, the adoption of the notion of the Responsibility to Protect, the support for 
preventive mechanisms, and the creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on the 
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Prevention of Genocide have brought improvements, there needs to be more visible 
collaboration among world leaders to go beyond national interest. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that even though R2P is the most important norm in the history 
of military humanitarian intervention, it has not completely altered the decision-making 
process; the exclusive right to act is still retained by the Security Council. “This means 
that national interests determine the response of the ‘international community’ to 
intervene in a crisis.” 
250
 Apparently, the enforcement of R2P in required situations of 
forcible action to prevent or halt mass atrocities is mostly predicated on the political will 
of UNSC – P5 or the willingness to go around the Security Council’s authority to the 
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